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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Overview 
 
This research is into the need for, and mechanisms to achieve satisfactory 
compensation for groups of consumers where they have suffered detriment.  The 
research was commissioned by the Department for Business, Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform (BERR) following consultations in 2006 on the issues of 
representative actions for consumers and regulatory justice.  The research considers 
the need for such measures and the mechanisms by which these options might be 
applied to consumer cases.   
 
Changes to the consumer protection regime in the UK should be considered within 
the context of a policy environment which sees the Government aiming to encourage 
parties to settle their disputes more quickly, cheaply and effectively and with court 
action the option of last resort. The Hampton Review (2005) on regulatory 
inspections and enforcement concluded that the regime for achieving compliance 
with business regulations was complex and ineffective.  Recommendations made by 
the review changed the way that regulators and enforcement officers go about their 
work. The Macrory Review (2006) into improving compliance among business looked 
in detail at sanctioning regimes and mechanisms for securing compliance with 
regulations.  The Macrory Review made a number of recommendations for improving 
the regulatory sanctioning system including recommendations that the Government 
should introduce pilot schemes involving the use of Restorative Justice techniques to 
cases of regulatory non-compliance, regulators should have an increased range of 
sanctions available to them including Fixed and Variable Monetary Administrative 
Penalties, and alternative sentencing options in the criminal courts should be 
introduced for cases relating to regulatory non-compliance.   
 
Both the Hampton and Macrory Reviews identified that the regulatory sanctioning 
regime is complex, ineffective and often fails to achieve redress for consumers.  The 
aim of the proposed reforms was to reduce the regulatory burden on business while 
introducing a more streamlined enforcement regime for regulatory infringements 
providing regulators with a wider range of enforcement options that went beyond 
simply punishing offenders.  The Government’s consultations on Hampton and 
Macrory were supplemented by a 2006 BERR consultation on representative actions 
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for consumers.  The premise of the proposal was that periodically groups of 
consumers lose relatively small sums at the hands of the same trader and that while 
some consumers have access to means that will resolve disputes there are many 
instances where alternative redress options have been exhausted and court action 
may be the only choice for the consumer.  However, vulnerable consumers might be 
reluctant to take court action, some consumers might be unaware of their rights or 
consider that the amount is too small to bother taking court action, and some 
consumers may simply be unable to navigate the legal process themselves or afford 
the legal fees necessary to do so.  In such cases, representative actions might 
provide a means for resolving the complaint by allowing a suitable body to bring an 
action on behalf of consumers.  However while the BERR consultation resulted in 
opinions on how such actions might work and some evidence that there may be 
support for making the option for representative actions available to consumers it did 
not provide compelling evidence of need for this option. 
 
This research therefore investigates the types of consumer cases that might be 
suitable for collective actions, and conducts an analysis of how representative 
actions would have to work to deliver results.  The research also looks at whether 
Restorative Justice would be an effective means of achieving redress without 
recourse to the court system in consumer cases and assesses the evidence of need 
for both options by looking at the areas where consumers currently have difficulty in 
achieving redress. 
 
This report attempts a synthesis between the two approaches of collective action 
(either by individuals acting as a group or through a representative body) and 
restorative justice, showing how they differ; how they may occupy different places in 
a scheme of redress for consumers and how they might effectively be engaged 
together when appropriate. 
 
1.2. Research Outline 
 
The research was designed to achieve the following outcomes: 
 
• Identify types of consumer cases (not including competition cases) where 
groups of consumers are suffering detriment and where representative 
actions might realistically deliver redress; 
 
Lincoln Law School A Report for BERR  
 
8 
• Assess the approximate likely number of such cases in the UK every year 
and the approximate amounts of money at stake; 
 
• Offer an initial analysis of the broad benefits of formal court action under a 
representative action for such cases, and explore how to operate effective 
systems that avoid a litigious culture; 
 
• Analyse whether alternative mechanisms such as non court-action under 
Restorative Justice or other forms of ADR would bring about resolution of 
cases where consumers have suffered detriment and have not received 
redress; 
 
• Identify whether Restorative Justice could work in consumer protection cases 
if public enforcers were offered the flexible remedies proposed in the 
Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Bill (now passed as the Regulatory 
Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008) and were prepared to use them to 
impose restorative remedies.  
 
The Hampton Review concluded that regulators do not give enough emphasis to 
providing advice to business to secure compliance with regulations.  The review also 
concluded that regulators lack effective tools to punish persistent offenders and 
reward compliant behaviour by business.   
 
Representative actions and Restorative Justice represent two different mechanisms 
for resolving consumer complaints and disputes with traders.  Representative actions 
provide for a means through which aggrieved consumers can pursue court action 
(together with other consumers who have suffered similar detriment) while 
Restorative Justice provides a means through which companies who have infringed 
regulations can put things right, often through dialogue with the affected party and by 
offering a solution that, where possible, repairs the harm caused by the trading or 
business practice.   
 
In carrying out this research project we have considered a number of issues relating 
to consumer redress and Restorative Justice.  Collective redress in consumer cases 
often relies on the input of lawyers who have sufficient interest in the case but in 
theory at least consumer groups and/or regulators might also be able to take cases 
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on behalf of consumers to resolve disputes that affect large numbers of consumers.  
The BERR consultation on representative actions identified; concerns among 
business about a move towards a more litigious culture and American style class 
actions, that consumer organisations and the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) consider 
that representative actions should be for both named and unnamed consumers, that 
legal firms were divided on whether there was a need for representative actions and 
that trading standards authorities generally supported confining representative 
actions to named consumers and supported permission stages to remove 
unwarranted claims.  Trading standards also had concerns about resource 
implications and we consider this issue within the research. 
 
Given the relatively short period in which this research was conducted there are 
inevitably limitations on what could be achieved and we make no pretence that the 
research findings offer a complete solution to the problem of consumer detriment.  
But we consider that the research aims have been broadly met and set out our 
reasoning below.     
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2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
The remit of this research is to consider the evidence of need for representative 
actions and restorative justice to be introduced into consumer cases and how such 
measures might need to work to achieve consumer redress.  To achieve this, the 
research has sought to identify the types of consumer cases (not including 
competition cases) where groups of consumers are suffering detriment and where 
representative actions might realistically deliver redress and to assess the 
approximate likely number of such cases in the UK every year and the approximate 
amounts of money at stake.  The research has also evaluated how representative 
actions would need to work through formal court action, whether alternative 
mechanisms such as non-court action under restorative justice and other forms of 
ADR could bring about resolution of cases where consumers have suffered detriment 
and has evaluated whether restorative justice operated by public enforcers could 
achieve effective consumer redress.  We are aware that some of the issues raised in 
this research report may be considered as part of the consumer law review being 
carried out by BERR but we include them here as part of our consideration of 
representative actions and restorative justice where appropriate.   
 
The evidence of the OFT and case examples provided by Trading Standards officers 
indicate that there is a significant number of cases where consumers suffer detriment 
and do not receive redress.  It is regrettably difficult to provide a precise figure for the 
number of cases because a range of factors can influence whether a case is reported 
to enforcement agencies for action.  The enforcement agency or regulator may also 
decide not to pursue a case and at the conclusion of the case records may not be 
kept of whether a remedy has been provided for the consumer or whether the 
consumer has needed to take civil action to resolve the matter.   
 
This research has, however, identified that even where enforcement action is 
effective and successful (including where a prosecution results in a conviction) this 
does not mean that consumers achieve redress.  Indeed trading standards officers, 
consumer representatives and the OFT agree that in the majority of cases 
consumers will still need to take civil action in order to obtain compensation or to 
achieve some other form of redress.  This being the case, the need for some form of 
restorative justice or other form of non-court ADR could be justified by the sheer 
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number of cases that do not result in an effective remedy for the consumer if the 
intent is to make it easier for them to do so.  While court action may provide for 
punishment of offenders and ultimately may result in changes to business behaviour 
consumers may still be left without adequate redress at the conclusion of the 
regulatory enforcement process and in the majority of cases will need to take civil 
action in order to obtain compensation or achieve some other forms of redress.  This 
puts individual consumers (or an affected group of consumers) at the disadvantage 
of having to seek legal advice and to bear the costs of their own legal action.  While 
there is an identifiable gap where consumers are not receiving redress the role of 
consumers is also an issue to be considered.  Significant numbers of consumers may 
choose not to take legal action for a variety of reasons.  The individualistic nature of 
cases also means that a wider problem that affects a number of consumers may not 
be resolved and that similarly affected consumers are not always identified.     
 
However this need for separate civil action to be taken as part of the process for 
achieving redress for consumers while identifying a clear inadequacy in the 
effectiveness of the regulatory enforcement regime should not be taken to mean that 
there is solely a need for new measures.  Trading Standards officers and business 
representatives have indicated flaws in the existing regime that means that even 
where the possibility for compensation to be awarded by the courts is available in 
consumer cases it is seldom used.  The lack of willingness by the courts to award 
compensation and redress to consumers may, therefore, be an issue that requires 
further study as it may offer an opportunity to provide for more effective redress for 
consumers under the existing consumer protection regime.  The use of conditional 
cautioning under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 has also been proposed as a means 
of achieving consumer redress and is an issue that has been pursued by LACORS.   
 
Our review of the responses to the 2006 BERR consultation on Representative 
Actions and interviews and evidence collated for this research indicate general 
agreement that representative actions could provide for more effective consumer 
redress by allowing a representative group to take on such actions on behalf of 
consumers.  However enforcers and regulators indicate that they do not wish to take 
responsibility for pursuing these cases and identify practical difficulties in taking 
representative action cases even if a mechanism to make this option more widely 
available is introduced.  (It should also be noted that business is not yet persuaded 
that there is a need for any additional measures).  In addition there are difficulties 
with consumer groups taking on representative action cases due to the lack of in-
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house legal expertise to bring such cases the cost of obtaining outside legal 
expertise and the current costs regime for such cases.   
 
Regulators and enforcers have concerns about having to take action to obtain 
redress for the consumer and effectively becoming ‘judge, jury and executioner’.  
They consider that the purpose of their enforcement action is to secure compliance 
with legislation rather than to punish business for causing harm to consumers.  In 
particular, enforcers consider that it is not their role to obtain compensation for 
consumers and explain that providing advice to business to achieve compliance is a 
legitimate means of resolving complaints.  Prosecution is often the last resort and a 
mechanism that regulators and enforcers accept frequently does not resolve things 
for the injured consumer.  Enforcers and regulators do not wish to take responsibility 
for taking representative action cases on behalf of consumers and there is a general 
reluctance to apply for powers to do so.  Enforcers and regulators would also be 
opposed to these powers being imposed on them and have concerns that cases that 
might achieve easy redress could result in unrealistic expectations on the part of 
consumers that regulators and enforcers can routinely achieve redress and there is 
no need for the consumer to take actions themselves. 
 
But if regulators are unlikely to take on representative actions on behalf of consumers 
there are also difficulties in consumer groups doing so.  With the exception of 
Citizens Advice Bureaux and Law Centres there does not currently exist a national 
network of consumer groups/centres potentially capable of taking on representative 
actions on a regional basis.  Resources, the need to employ lawyers and the costs 
regime in civil cases are all factors that would prevent national organisations such as 
the NCC (now Consumer Focus), Which? and Citizens Advice from taking on 
representative actions at a national level.  There does not, therefore, appear to be an 
easy solution to the problem of who would be able to take on representative action 
cases on behalf of consumers even if the option were available.  This does not, 
however, mean that the option for representative actions should not be attempted 
and we propose a model for introducing representative actions that would allow 
consumer groups to work with lawyers to bring cases and a means through which 
consumer groups at a local and national level could also bring cases on behalf of 
affected consumers.  There are difficulties in doing so but a number of case models 
are presented in this research which identify the issues that may be suitable for 
representative actions.     
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This research also identifies that understanding of exactly what restorative justice is 
varies among enforcers, regulators, business and consumer groups with knowledge 
of the principle of victim-offender dialogue and compensation frequently shown by 
respondents.  But restorative remedies for complaints need not consist solely of 
financial compensation and can involve other means of making reparation; primarily 
aimed at putting the consumer back in the position that they would have been in had 
the fault not occurred while also recognising the inconvenience to which consumers 
have been put and in some cases providing some remedy that recognises this 
element of a complaint or dispute.  We consider that the reliance on financial 
compensation in debates about restorative justice in consumer cases is potentially 
misleading as there is scope for enforcers and regulators to implement a wider range 
of remedies which truly reflect the harm caused to consumers.  Where it is not 
possible to put the consumer back in the position they would have been in had the 
fault not occurred ‘compensation’ could mean some other means of addressing or 
recognising the harm caused to consumers.  For example payment of ‘time and 
trouble’ compensation, an apology or the taking of remedial measures that address 
the wider harm caused by a business practice such as; providing an enhanced or 
discounted service, funding a consumer education programme or environmental 
improvements or initiating a product replacement scheme.  Business representatives 
have also provided examples of where business voluntarily does this which indicates 
that the undertaking provisions contained within the Regulatory Enforcement and 
Sanctions Act 2008 might provide a means through which business and regulators 
can work together to apply restorative principles and achieve redress for consumers, 
even where no formal victim/offender dialogue is carried out as part of finding a 
remedy. 
 
However the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 also provides for 
restorative penalties to be applied by regulators and enforcers but this research 
identifies that there is no clear consensus on how and when such penalties would be 
used.  Some trading standards officers have indicated that they consider that 
restorative justice would be more suitable for ‘low level’ non-criminal offences and 
should not be used across the board in consumer cases.   
 
The view of regulators and enforcers expressed in this research was overwhelmingly 
that any restorative penalties should be subject to criminal rather than civil 
enforcement.  The reason given for this is the difficulty in enforcing civil sanctions, 
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with enforcers and regulators indicating that the payment of civil penalties and 
compliance with court judgements is relatively low and that little attention is paid to 
ensuring that traders and businesses convicted at court and required to provide 
redress actually do so.  Enforcers indicate that because of this they would be 
reluctant to use any new powers (other than fixed penalty fines) unless there was a 
clear process in place for ensuring that any remedies are carried out.  This also 
makes the use of the small claims court undesirable. 
 
Lack of knowledge of their rights by consumers may hamper the level of opt-in to 
representative action cases and so mechanisms to ensure either that consumers are 
actively sought out to join in a representative action or to provide for redress for other 
consumers similarly affected in the event of a successful case are essential.  
 
While both restorative justice and representative actions may in theory provide a 
solution to the problem of consumer redress the evidence is that despite some 
evidence of need there are a number of problems with introducing restorative justice 
and representative action measures and that there are specific case models where 
problems may occur and effective consumer redress may not be achieved.  We 
outline some of the difficulties in this research and discuss specific case examples 
that illustrate both how representative actions and restorative justice could work in 
consumer cases but also where they are unlikely to be successful and the reasons 
for this.  For example there are significant difficulties in pursuing either representative 
actions or restorative justice in cases where traders are based overseas, simply 
disappear to avoid enforcement action and litigation or in those cases involving 
multiple small amounts of money (i.e. a large number of consumers suffering a small 
amount of financial loss or detriment) where the trader would not realistically be able 
to pay any compensation or costs or lacks the resources to carry out any other form 
of redress identified as suitable for resolving a dispute.   
 
One proposal put forward during interviews, in the academic literature and 
considered by this research is that of an independent Consumer Ombudsman along 
the lines of the Nordic Ombudsmen who could consider representative actions and 
implement restorative justice to deliver effective and efficient enforcement, 
compensation and redress for consumers.  Having such an independent, publicly 
funded adjudicator could result in a considerable saving on the cost of private 
collective actions, eliminate the concerns of regulators and consumer groups about 
the costs of these actions and also address the concerns of business about the 
Lincoln Law School A Report for BERR  
 
15 
changed enforcement regime.  We consider the role of Ombudsmen as 
representative bodies in this research but acknowledge that such a move would 
require fresh legislation.  But the development and costing of pilot approaches on 
restorative justice and representative actions is an issue that needs consideration in 
addressing these issues and we highlight those areas where further research and/or 
pilot approaches may yield benefits. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
 
 
This research was carried out using a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
data.  Structured questionnaires were used (see appendixes) which included 
questions designed to obtain quantitative data relating to the number of consumer 
protection cases reported and prosecuted each year.  Qualitative questions were 
also designed to obtain views on restorative justice and representative actions and 
evidence from enforcers, regulators and consumer groups on cases where 
consumers continue to suffer detriment.   
 
3.1. Data Collection and research stages 
 
Our methodology for the research included a combination of questionnaires, 
interviews and electronic survey methods together with extensive use of 
documentary evidence.  The survey design was tested with trading standards officers 
and our own research staff to identify the survey design most likely to yield 
meaningful results but recognised that the response rate was likely to be low.  The 
primary data collection was supplemented with a review of the literature and best 
practice on restorative justice and representative actions and also a review of the 
responses to previous consultations on regulatory justice, representative actions in 
consumer protection cases and on the draft Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions 
Bill.  The primary data collection was carried out in the following stages: 
 
- Stage 1 consisted of a preliminary questionnaire to enforcers in the East 
Midlands and Eastern Regions and to a small number of selected regulators 
such as the OFT.  The objective of Stage 1 was to produce a sample of 
responses that would provide interim data on the types and number of 
consumer protection cases that might be suitable for restorative justice and 
representative actions.  Data collected in Stage 1 also provided responses 
that identified issues to be explored in the next stages of the research.  The 
responses also identified changes that needed to be made in the research 
questionnaires or specific issues to be explored in the research interviews.  
For example, early responses at Stage 1 identified that there was no shared 
understanding of what restorative justice was and so the questionnaires and 
research covering letter needed to reflect the possible lack of understanding 
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of the issue under consideration.   
 
- Stage 2 consisted of a questionnaire to consumer groups and consumer 
representatives such as the NCC, Which? And Citizens Advice to identify 
their views and obtain evidence on the types of cases, number of cases and 
the value (to the consumer) of cases that they would wish to see pursued via 
representative actions.   
 
- Stage 3 consisted of a roll out of the questionnaire to a wider group of trading 
standards officers and enforcers to provide greater coverage in England and 
Wales. This aspect of the project was intended to identify any difference in 
views between trading standards officers, enforcers and regulators and to 
ensure that a sufficient number of responses were obtained to produce a 
meaningful sample of responses for the research. 
 
- Stage 4 consisted of interviews with trading standards officers, other 
enforcers and regulators, consumer groups and consumer representatives 
and some business representatives. 
 
The primary data collection exercise was carried out alongside a review of: 
 
- Consultation responses on Regulatory Justice in a post-Hampton World 
 
- Consultation responses on Representative Actions in Consumer Protection 
legislation. 
 
- The enforcement policies of trading standards offices in the East Midlands 
and Eastern regions.    
 
Analysis of this documentary information helped to identify issues to be pursued in 
the interviews and for consideration in developing case models.   
 
3.2. Response to the research  
 
There was a 25% response to the Stage 1 ‘pilot’ questionnaires.  While this 
represented a low response level to the 20 questionnaires sent out at Stage 1 it was 
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not entirely unexpected.  It was anticipated that busy enforcement offices would not 
immediately respond and might require some encouragement to do so.  In addition, 
the imminence of the Trading Standards Institute (TSI) Conference which took place 
within three weeks of the questionnaires being despatched was thought to be a factor 
that might affect the responses with authorities either waiting to hand in their 
questionnaires at the conference or wishing to raise questions or request interviews 
at the conference where a BERR workshop on Restorative Justice was held.  Indeed 
at this workshop at the TSI conference a number of authorities requested interviews 
and presentations on the research and indicated that questionnaires had been 
received within their offices but had not yet been completed.  Officers in three 
authorities expressed some concern that their managers might not respond to the 
research and requested additional questionnaires to be sent direct to them to ensure 
that a response was submitted by their office.  One consumer group (the NCC who 
had received a questionnaire as part of Stage 2 of the research) also requested an 
interview which took place within three weeks of the TSI Conference. 
 
Pressure of work was cited by a number of officers as a reason for not responding to 
the research.  This was anticipated as a potential problem and we also anticipated 
that a number of officers would not view completion of a questionnaire or a response 
to the research letter as a priority.  To address the issues the following steps were 
carried out: 
  
• The handing out of an additional 25 questionnaires at the TSI conference.  Some 
trading standards offices also provided business cards requesting that an 
electronic version of the questionnaire be sent to them; 
• Carrying out a ‘focus group’ exercise as part of the BERR Restorative Justice 
Workshop which allowed us to establish whether trading standards officers 
attending the conference shared the views of others that had already been raised 
during the research;  
• Follow-up emails, telephone calls and letters to those offices that were sent a 
questionnaire in the original sample of questionnaires but who had not 
responded; and 
• Commencing the formal programme of interviews. 
 
Despite the programme of follow-up work, responses from trading standards officers 
and consumer groups remained low but where possible, documentary evidence was 
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used to identify relevant views on the research issues.   
 
3.3. Nature of the responses  
 
Not all respondents elected to complete the questionnaire when responding to the 
research and a number of interviews were arranged for those that preferred to 
provide information in this way.  Organisations approached to take part in this 
research were given a choice of whether to complete a research questionnaire or 
take part in an interview.  Interviews proved to be the most popular mechanism for 
individuals to provide evidence for the research.  The number of organisations 
approached to take part in the research and the number of interviews subsequently 
undertaken is shown below: 
 
Type of Organisation Sample approached (n) Interviews achieved (n) 
Enforcer/Regulator 50 8 
Consumer Group or 
Representative 
10 2 
Other1  10 4 
 
TOTAL 
 
70 
 
14 
 
Some 15 Trading Standards Offices (TSOs) indicated that they would respond to the 
questionnaire but did not do so.  The short timescale allowed for this research and 
other business pressures are factors in this and two regional trading standards 
organisations have indicated that they require presentations on the research at which 
they might submit further evidence.  Due to their already agreed meetings calendars 
these presentations are outside the timescale allowed for this research.  However the 
willingness of officers to discuss issues during telephone interviews helped to ensure 
that information was received.  Officers also referred to their previous consultation 
responses on Representative Actions, Regulatory Justice and the draft Regulatory 
Enforcement and Sanctions Bill as adequately reflecting their current views even 
though some changes had been made to the draft Bill which addressed some early 
concerns.    
 
                                                          
1
 The ‘Other’ category in this table includes business representatives and representative 
bodies such as LACORS and the TSI   
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The relatively low level of questionnaire responses from TSOs was a concern as 
interview responses while providing valuable qualitative data and casework examples 
did not always provide the required quantitative data on numbers of cases and the 
value of cases in terms of consumer detriment.  However, the OFT provided a 
comprehensive response which in addition to a completed questionnaire also 
included: 
  
• Evidence on the number of cases taken by Trading Standards across England – 
trading standards are required to inform the OFT of intended and actual 
prosecutions and OFT data supplied as part of its response provides data on 
numbers of cases and the total amount of fines by category of offence (e.g. 
second-hand cars) and area of legislation (e.g. Trade Descriptions Act 1968); 
• Consumer Complaints data – the OFT has provided more detailed data on 
numbers of complaints received by Consumer Direct, data from its consumer law 
casework and data on consumer credit casework; 
• The Consumer Detriment Report – the OFT has supplied a copy of this report 
which assesses the overall value of detriment in the consumer sector and the 
frequency with which consumers experience problems with goods and services;  
• Mass Market Scams – The OFT supplied a copy of its (2004) research report into 
mass marketed scams which estimates the direct cost to UK consumers of scams 
to be at least £1 billion a year; and  
• Enforcement priorities – The OFT has also provided information on its 
enforcement principles and enforcement priorities and this evidence is helpful in 
identifying how regulators determine which cases will be pursued and where this 
might differ from the views of enforcers such as trading standards.   
 
In addition the OFT provided some examples of enforceable undertakings accepted 
by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) and this 
supplemented our own research into the enforceable undertakings model in 
operation in Australia.  Case information and the issues of the research were also 
explored further in an interview with representatives from the OFT. 
 
The views of business were also considered in this research.  In addition to an 
analysis of the previous consultation responses on the issues referred to above, a 
meeting was arranged with the CBI’s Legal Advisor, a representative from the British 
Retail Consortium and a representative from Boots PLC (also the Chair of the CBI’s 
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Consumer Affairs Panel).  This joint interview provided much useful information on 
the views of business and was supplemented with policy information from the CBI on 
Collective Redress. 
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4. CONSUMER GROUPS/REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS 
 
PARALLEL TRACKS: SANCTIONS & CIVIL ACTIONS 
 
4.1. Sanctions 
 
Part Three of the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 (‘The Act’) by 
offering an enhanced sanctions regime to local authority regulators will, in 
accordance with the recommendations of the Macrory Review, shift attention from 
criminal proceedings against those who have breached regulatory requirements to a 
regime based on civil penalties, including fixed and discretionary penalties.  Whilst, 
the nature of the legislation is that the details will emerge as secondary legislation it 
is clear that the emerging regime of fixed and variable monetary penalties; 
compliance notices; restoration notices and enforcement undertakings will give 
regulators a subtle and powerful range of enforcement tools. 
 
The Act changes the underlying philosophy of local authority regulators, particularly, 
TSOs from ‘neutral’ prosecutors putting evidence before a third party tribunal for an 
independent decision to a body much more involved in tailoring the sanction to the 
offence and to the wider public interest subject, of course, to an appeal to an 
independent tribunal.  It seems inevitable that this wider role will bring regulators into 
a more direct relationship with complainants as they will be responsible for the whole 
process of sanctioning rather than simply evidence gathering and if a decision is 
made to prosecute putting the matter before the court.  In particular the discretionary 
penalties procedure which involves receiving representations and/or objections from 
the regulated person might well evolve in appropriate cases (particularly group 
cases) to a tripartite arrangement whereby the victim is also consulted about the 
process and its destination.  This seems in harmony with regulatory principles 
including the transparency and accountability requirements of Section 5(2) of the Act 
and the concept of consistency.  While, the legislation is focused on regulated 
persons, e.g. traders, there seems no reason why the regulatory philosophy cannot 
encompass the relationship with the injured person.  Indeed there are many reasons 
why this should be so.  Certainly it would be in accordance with the current 
Consumer Law Review which in Section 3 calls for reform to assist consumer 
empowerment and at Section 3.1 (a) calls for consumers who: ‘have knowledge and 
means to exercise their rights and adequate support to resolve disputes 
proportionately’. 
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A difficult question is whether, in accordance with the BERR approach as outlined in 
the Consumer Law Review (at 3.25) and in accordance with wider government 
policy, the objective to encourage Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), for example 
by mediation by a neutral mediator whose task is to bring the parties together and 
attempt to produce a settlement often by suggesting a ‘creative’ solution,2 fits into the 
approach outlined above.  The regulatory enforcer under the Act will act as 
prosecutor and determiner of penalty, subject to appeal.  While the Act sets out an 
approach of dialogue between the regulator and the regulated person3 this report 
suggests that dialogue could, in appropriate cases, be widened to include an injured 
party.   
 
Here there is potential conflict between the regulator in a prosecutorial/adjudication 
role with a public duty to do justice impartially4 and the concept of ADR with its 
philosophy of attempting to create space for agreement between parties.  As stated 
above ADR attempts not just to slice up the amount claimed in a zero sum game but 
to ‘make the cake larger’ so that ‘nobody loses’.  Classic examples of this occur in 
commercial disputes for example a contractual dispute over the quality of goods 
supplied by a manufacturer to a retailer.  This might be resolved by the manufacturer 
agreeing to guarantee quality and offer a price discount in return for the retailer 
placing a larger order.  In this way the commercial relationship is preserved. (There 
are obvious comparisons in other situations where continuing relationship is 
important e.g. within the family, at work etc)  This type of situation may occur in the 
context of consumer/retailer.  For example, a settlement relating to defective goods 
may involve both the replacement of the goods and discounts on further purchasers 
to enhance consumer loyalty.  However, there are many cases with a dispute over a 
major one off purchase where the consumer wants redress and, possibly an apology, 
but has no great desire or need to continue in relationship with the retailer or 
manufacturer. 
 
                                                          
2
 Section 27 of the Act (Guidance and the Acceptance of Undertakings) 
3
 Department for Business Enterprise & Regulatory Reform, (2008) ‘Regulatory Enforcement 
and Sanctions Act 2008: Guidance to the Act’, London:BERR 
 
4
 The role of prosecutor and initial tribunal is an unusual one in English law but will borrow 
from these roles the impartiality in relation to the injured person (victim) and regulated person 
that is found in the Prosecutor’s Code and the duty to act impartiality laid on courts and 
tribunals (http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/code2004english.pdf ) 
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It is important to note that ADR is not a ‘free lunch’.  Whilst rates for ADR vary most 
mediators charge an hourly or daily rate and in complex cases the charges can be 
high.   
 
Although in some sectoral ADR schemes the retailer/manufacturer pays the costs of 
ADR in any event this is not always so.  Thus, whilst settlement of consumer cases 
will normally include the retailer/manufacturer paying these costs the consumer 
cannot be sure going into the ADR process that some of the bill might have to be 
paid by the consumer in any event.  Sorting this charging issue in advance of the 
ADR process will simply add to the charges of any lawyer involved. 
 
It may be that a more appropriate approach is that of restorative justice which as 
stated at Section 5.8 below provides that  
 
‘Potentially it is in the area of achieving reparation for consumers that 
restorative justice can best be applied to consumer cases.  The core 
values of restorative justice are to secure healing for the victim, 
responsibility on the part of offenders and making amends for the 
offence.  In consumer cases, this can be achieved as long as 
enforcers and designated regulators have the power to make binding 
awards and pursue negotiated settlements for complaints.  Where 
legislation provides that regulators can decide not to take enforcement 
action if they can achieve compliance through negotiation and 
settlement with potential offenders; this option could be used by 
applying restorative principles.’  
 
This argument is expanded in Section 5 of this report but it is clear from the analysis 
in this report that, in this context, restorative justice has more in common with 
negotiation in the context of a sanction regime between a public regulator and a 
regulated person or organisation than the approach of ADR, in particular mediation, 
which envisages parties resolving a dispute between them without the wider public 
interest necessarily being involved. 
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4.2. Civil Action 
 
The parallel track to enforcement albeit of the subtle and dynamic approach 
envisaged in the Bill is civil action between individual consumers or groups of 
consumers and a defendant or defendants who are alleged to have harmed the 
consumer.  ADR continues to have influence as part of a settlement process or when 
‘suggested’ by a judge.5 
 
4.3. Lessons from Competition Damage Cases 
 
This research deals with consumer cases excluding competition damage cases.  The 
work in that area is well advanced and subject to a White Paper from DG Comp6.  
However, there are important lessons to be learned from that area because in 
relation to some aspects of competition damages e.g. individual consumers damaged 
by cartel activity there are areas of close comparison.  A consumer may be damaged 
by being overcharged by a cartelist or by buying goods on a false description from a 
single trader not acting anti-competitively in a classic sense (e.g. in a cartel or by 
exploiting a dominant position) but by exploiting asymmetry of information 
‘persuading’ a consumer to purchase a product at an overprice.  Most importantly 
there are procedural and practical examples that can be read across to consumer 
redress. These include issues of ‘equality of arms’ and the use of a regulatory finding 
of bad behaviour in the context of follow on civil action (effectively ‘pleading a 
conviction’ in a civil case which makes the task of proving the case very much easier) 
 
4.4. A Brief Overview of Individual Litigation 
 
This section is not addressed to practicing litigation lawyers who will find it superficial 
but to those stakeholders and policy makers with expertise in the regulatory/criminal 
enforcement area rather than in acting as agents for individuals in civil cases.  As 
noted in Section 4.9 and elsewhere in this report many agencies in the field of 
consumer redress, including TSOs, have not historically been much engaged in the 
civil courts. 
                                                          
5
 English judges cannot force parties to mediate but by reminding them of the cost danger of 
unreasonably refusing to mediate they can ‘persuade’ them.  Halsey 
 
6
 Commission of the European Communities, (2008) ‘White Paper on Damages for breach of 
the EC antitrust rules: COM (2008) 165 Final’, Brussels: Commission of the European 
Lincoln Law School A Report for BERR  
 
26 
 
Individual consumers who suffer loss through the wrongful acts of businesses have a 
range of substantive law remedies (breach of contract; tort; statutory duty etc) which 
can be pursued through the courts.  If these claims are of sufficient importance to the 
individual ─ normally equated with monetary loss ─ disappointment and aggravation 
not normally being recoverable heads of damage ─ then there are grounds to 
proceed in a ‘good case’.  A ‘good case’ in this context is a complex matrix of risk 
assessment of the certainty of the substantive law; the quality of the evidence; the 
ability to prove the loss; the procedural regime; the tenacity of the prospective 
claimant and, most importantly, the chances of the prospective defendant satisfying a 
judgment.  These factors are never wholly certain and wronged parties in the UK (as 
compared to other areas of Europe such as Germany7) are generally reluctant 
litigators.   
 
The key problem & the key advantage for individual litigants is the cost of going to 
law, the price of entering the court arena.  The problem relates to the currently open 
ended and unpredictable nature of lawyers’ charges (normally calculated on an 
hourly paid basis in excess of £200 for civil work).  If a case is brought by an 
individual and lost then the claimant pays the defendant’s costs: if the case is won 
then the defendant pays all or a high proportion of the claimant’s costs.   
 
Litigation in the Small Claims track of the County Court (for non personal injury 
claims of less than £5000) is less of a financial risk because the loser does not 
normally pay the winner’s lawyer’s fees. However, in a ‘good case’ this cost 
protection might not be in the interest of a claimant as if the claimant instructs a 
lawyer then the lawyer’s fee will have to come out of recovered damages rather than 
be paid by the loser.  The headroom between a recovery of £5,000 or less and the 
likely lawyer’s bill may well be insufficient to make bringing the case economic. 
 
Costs include court fees and out payments (disbursements) such as expert fees.  
Historically court fees have been relatively low in the United Kingdom, certainly as 
compared with the rest of Europe.  However, this is somewhat of a false comparison 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Communities. Professor Peysner was part of the expert group co-ordinated by the Centre for 
European Policy Studies (CEPS) which contributed to this white paper. 
7
 Stuyk, J. Terryn, E., Colaert, V., Van Dyck, T., Peretz, E., Nele Hoekx, N. and 
Tereszkiewicz, P., (2007) ‘An analysis and evaluation of alternative means of consumer 
redress other than redress through ordinary judicial proceedings: Final Report’, Katholieke 
University Leuven/European Commission 
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as in European (Civil Law) countries the civil judge carries out tasks (such as 
interviewing witnesses) which in the UK would be carried out by the lawyers who will 
charge for it.  In any event court fees in England and Wales have been rising at an 
accelerating rate in recent years.8  In the Small Claims Track fees are not 
inconsiderable and may act as a dis-incentive.9 
 
However, if litigants do proceed the conditional fee (no win: no fee) system (CFA) 
introduced under the Access to Justice Act 1998 which effectively replaced legal aid 
for civil money claims, offers a viable way forward, particularly for personal injury 
claims.  Many CFAs for individuals are now on a no win; no fee/win:no fee basis.  
That is the lawyer will rely on what is recovered from the defendant if the case is lost, 
not charging their client any irrecoverable hourly charges and take a hit if the case is 
lost.  This obliges lawyers to carefully risk manage what cases they take on including 
the risk of whether the defendant is ‘judgment proof’.  It follows that this type of 
offering by lawyers is most likely in areas such as personal injury or housing disrepair 
where defendants are ‘judgment proof’ insurance companies or public authorities 
rather than in consumer law.10 
 
This system protects the individual against their own lawyer’s fees but not the risk of 
paying their own disbursements or the winning defendant’s legal fees and 
disbursements.  Litigation insurance covers this risk.  This can be either ‘after the 
event insurance’ or ‘before the event’/’legal expense cover’. 
 
‘After the Event’ (ATE) insurance is purchased on a case by case basis to support a 
CFA and the premium is normally recoverable from the losing defendant.  Although, 
the insurance applies to the individual case its calculation (rating) will be influenced 
by the pool of similar cases in the insurer’s book and their success rate.  Prior to the 
credit crunch the premium would often be paid after the case either by the losing 
                                                          
8
 ‘The Council remains very concerned about the high level of fees, driven by the policy of full 
cost recovery’. Annual Report of the Civil Justice Council 2007 Section 1.11  
 
9
 £108 to issue a case in the court; £35 for allocating money claims between £1500 and 
£5,000 (no fee below) and £300 for the hearing fee if the claim is over £3,000 (less below) i.e. 
to claim for, say, £4000 costs  £443. 
10
 As many individual consumer claims will be under the small claims track limit they will 
benefit from the more user friendly procedure of this track in the County Court.  However, 
winning cases with a simple procedure does not guarantee that the enforcement means 
available are satisfactory to recover damages and fees.  See J Baldwin, Evaluating the 
Effectiveness of Enforcement Procedures in Undefended Claims in the Civil Courts, London: 
Lord Chancellor's Department Research Series 3/03 (2003). 
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defendant alongside other disbursements or out of the proceeds of the policy.11  
Nowadays individuals will increasingly be asked to pay the premium in advance or 
take out a Consumer Credit Agreement to cover the premium as a way of reducing 
the insurer’s risk (e.g. that the case is won but the defendant goes insolvent.) 
 
Before the Event (BTE) insurance is generally sold to individuals as an add-on to 
household or motor policies.  As the premiums are for generic cover they are not 
recoverable in a single case.  In principle the insurer pays the individual’s lawyer 
whether the case is won or lost but in practice lawyers who do this type of work 
cannot recover their fees from the BTE insurer and so they carefully risk manage 
their case load to ensure that they lose as few cases as possible. 
 
Third Party Funding is a relatively new type of litigation support and is currently 
unregulated.12 Essentially it involves selling a share in the prospects of damages to 
an external party (often a venture capitalist) in return for financial support from that 
third party for the legal and other costs of bringing the case and an indemnity against 
having to pay costs if the case is lost. This type of funding cannot benefit from the 
pooling of risk involved in BTE insurance and to a lesser extent in ATE insurance.  As 
such the cost of support can be very high: figures of up to 40% are mentioned. 
 
None of the above funding methods are predicated on the assumption that litigation 
is resolved by a judge at trial: less than 2% of civil cases issued in England and 
Wales reach trial.  The most powerful procedural device to produce settlement is Part 
36 of the Civil Procedural Rules which ratchets up the cost risk of litigation.  The rule 
is a highly sophisticated system of risk transfer which allows both a claimant or 
defendant (or any multiple of them) to make offers to settle.  For example, the 
claimant offers to settle for a given figure.  If the defendant declines and the claimant 
matches or beats the figure then the claimant will be awarded additional costs and 
interest. The defendant can also make an offer to settle which if the claimant fails to 
‘beat’ will, effectively, reduce the cost recovery the claimant can make leaving the 
claimant out of pocket.  These are very effective ways of bringing to parties’ attention 
the transaction costs of litigation.   
                                                          
11
 This so called ‘magic bullet’ is an accounting device to post a notional premium as a cost to 
an insurer’s account which in due course is either paid by the other party as part of the cost of 
losing the case or is absorbed into the insurer’s overall payment out to the insured if the case 
is lost.  In effect the insurer lends the premium to the insured. 
12
 Napier, J., Hurst, P., Moorhead, R Musgrove R and Stutt, C., (2007) ‘Improved Access to 
Justice:Funding Options and Proportionate Costs’, Civil Justice Council   
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Civil litigation in England and Wales is governed by the Civil Procedural Rules which 
while preserving the judge as a neutral referee and arbiter of the substantive issues 
in the case as advanced by the parties gives the judge the leading role in deciding 
procedural issues by the exercise of case management powers.  For example the 
extent of documentary evidence and the use of experts will be ultimately determined 
by the judge. A party cannot simply ‘outspend’ another by demanding the production 
of masses of documents: the judge will determine if the documents are relevant and 
that the costs of their identification and production are proportionate. 
 
This overview of the system for individuals suggests a carefully risk managed system 
as the following table suggests: 
 
RISK MANAGEMENT OF RISK 
Substantive law or procedural 
problems 
Use of a lawyer as 
adviser/representative 
Need to identify recoverable 
damages 
Ditto 
Risk of winning case but having to 
pay own lawyer & disbursements 
because defendant cannot pay 
CFA for own lawyers  or ATE/BTE 
insurance/Third Party Funding 
Risk of winning case but not 
recovering sufficient costs from 
Defendant to pay own lawyer’s fees 
CFA on no win: no fee/win: no fee 
basis 
 
 
The above analysis whilst not suggesting that litigation is a pursuit to be taken on 
with equanimity does suggest that a careful deployment of risk management 
techniques can allow litigation risk to be assessed and catered for.   
 
The above conclusion relates to generic individual litigation.  In some areas of 
disputes, such as contract disputes between established businesses, civil action will 
be one of the methods of dispute resolution routinely considered if negotiations fail ─ 
although arbitration and ADR may be preferred. However, in the area of individual 
consumer redress civil action is rare.  One study found that less than 1% of 
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consumer actions led to court action.13 There may, of course, be an ongoing cost 
benefit analysis here reflecting the fact that most consumer claims are modest and 
that grossing up modest claims in collective action would be, all things being equal, 
more attractive to individuals in a sort of ‘herd’ instinct.  However, when individual 
cases are aggregated as groups the risk management measures outlined above 
become much less effective.  While the damages recoverable may simply be the 
aggregate of individual claims the risks are likely to be much higher and this, together 
with some residual procedural problems, explains why in England, as compared to 
the USA, collective actions are rare.  The question of risk is the lieitmotif for 
considering collective consumer redress by way of civil litigation. 
 
4.5. Collective Actions 
 
From a common sense point of view dealing with cases that share characteristics by 
litigating them together is plainly right.  It saves money and resources, particularly 
judicial resources, by preventing the same issues being litigated and re-litigated in 
individual actions in different courts.  (This is vividly illustrated in the ongoing litigation 
concerning bank charges which have been mired in complications involving 
thousands of cases proceeding independently.)  Costs continue to ‘follow the event’ 
but the costs of generic issues are shared between the parties in the group and, it is 
assumed, the lawyer’s work benefits all the group without having to be repeated.  It 
seems to have the same comparative advantage that Adam Smith found in mass 
production.  Regrettably, the history of group actions in the UK reveals quite as many 
disadvantages as advantages and some cases, such as the pharmaceutical cases 
(Ativan etc) have been disastrous.  
 
It is currently impossible to make any sensible estimate of the cost of any type of 
complex action proceeding in the Multi-Track (the case managed track) of the civil 
courts in England.  While, estimates of costs have to be filed they are not generally 
regarded as robust or necessarily represent the actual costs of the final outcome.  
However, in it would be normal for the joint costs of collective actions to run well into 
six figures.  Cases involving pharmaceuticals or industrial disease will have joint 
costs running into millions. 
 
                                                          
13
 H.Genn , Paths to Justice, Hart, Oxford, 1999 p. 156 
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In considering collective actions three interwoven themes emerge in relation to 
procedure and finance: 
 
• Procedural Issues: The Opt In/Opt Out Debate  
• Funding Issues & Cost Mitigation 
• Collective actions proceeding by way of a representative/specified 
body 
 
Collective actions have been a matter of great concern for at least a decade in 
England and of increasing interest in Europe.  One off litigation ─ business against 
business; individual against individual etc ─ remains the bedrock of dispute 
resolution and litigation. However, the process of globalisation; national and 
international mass marketing and production inevitably leads to an increasing 
emphasis on ‘massification’ the emergence of groups of victims of actionable disease 
or injury or civil wrong.14  This is reflected in a series of reports which have 
attempted, not wholly successfully, to address the question of access to justice in 
relation to collective issues.  The main reports which have informed our work are: 
 
• Lord Woolf’s Access to Justice Final Report (Chapter 17)15  
•  OFT's response to the EU consultation on consumer collective 
redress benchmarks16 
• EU Commission re Third Party damage claims in competition17  
• Civil Justice Council Reports 18 
• Reports to the Northern Ireland Legal Services Commission on 
development of a Contingency Legal Services Fund (CLAF)19 
• Professor Mulheron’s research20 into class actions and collective 
redress. 
                                                          
14
 Mulheron, (2004) The Class Action in Common law Legal Systems, Hart Publishing 
15
 http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/contents.htm  
 
16
 http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/oft_response_to_consultations/oft983.pdf 
 
17
 See footnote 10 for reference 
18
 See footnote 12 for reference. (This report builds on an earlier report ‘ Improved Access to 
Justice - Funding Options & Proportionate Costs’ 
http://www.civiljusticecouncil.gov.uk/publications/pr_0905.htm) of which Professor Peysner 
was co-author) 
19
 See J.Peysner ‘Follow the Money: Money Damage Cases in Northern Ireland’ in the 
anthology , Transforming Lives: Law and Social Process, Legal Services Research Centre, 
London, 2007 
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Dr. Christopher Hodges’ work on regulation enforcement and compensation21 which 
looks at the better regulation agenda and the implications of this and the Macrory 
report, Hodges work on regulation and civil justice22 and his work on regulating 
consumer protection.23 
 
The essential difficulty in most cases, particularly personal injury cases, is that cases 
may be both similar and different.  They may share a common basis on which to 
establish liability but the damage claims, the quantum, may be quite different or there 
may be issues of contributory negligence that divides one case from another.  Time 
saved by trying the cases together may be lost by arguments over these aspects.  
 
4.6. Procedural Issues: The Opt In/Opt Out Debate  
 
The Civil Procedural Rules instituted a specific set of rules for the aggregation and 
case management of cases which in accordance with the overriding objectives of the 
rules are more cost effective and justly tried together rather than separately: a Group 
Litigation Order (GLO).  However, assuming that, as stated above, a modern 
consumer society is marked by mass production and mass consumerisation the fact 
that many individuals or small businesses share potential claims is not reflected in 
the number of group actions/claims actually brought ─ some 62 since 2000.  A key 
reason for this is that a GLO requires a positive step by a prospective claimant to ‘opt 
in’ to join the ‘club’ to obtain all the benefits and suffer any detriments.  This 
compares with the US style Opt Out system which establishes a judicially approved 
class of potential claimants, of which only a few may be actively involved at this 
stage. Many claimants are effectively ‘in’ the class action without having to take a 
                                                                                                                                                                      
20
 Mulheron (2008) ‘Reform of Collective Redress in England & Wales: A Perspective of 
Need’, a report for the Civil Justice Council 
(http://www.civiljusticecouncil.gov.uk/files/collective_redress.pdf) 
 
21
 C. Hodges ‘Encouraging Enterprise and Rebalancing Risk: Implications of Economic Policy 
for Regulation, Enforcement and Compensation’ European Business Law Review (2007) 6: 
1231 and C. Hodges The Reform of Class and Representative Actions in European Legal 
Systems, Hart, Oxford, 2008. 
 
22
 C. Hodges, ‘Competition enforcement, regulation and civil justice: what is the case?’ 
Common Market Law Review 43: 1-27, 2006. 
 
23
 C. Hodges, ‘Collectivism: Evaluating the effectiveness of public and private models for 
regulating consumer protection’ in W. van Boom and M. Loos (eds), Collective Consumer 
Interests and How They Are Best Served in Europe (Kluwer, 2007). 
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step and may become actively involved to claim their share of damages or benefits at 
a later stage.  
 
The Opt Out system might appear unfair: why should a citizen with a contingent claim 
have it resolved with other claims without the individual’s full and free consent?  The 
main justification is that if efficiency suggests that issues should be dealt with 
together then opt out remains possible (if difficult) and, in any event, the whole 
process is carried out under judicial control.  Most importantly, the claimants’ actual 
or prospective membership of a class does not have financial consequences.  The 
general pattern in the USA is that cases can be brought by claimants with only limited 
exposure to paying the other side’s costs and fees if the case is lost.  Their liability for 
their own expense is limited by the wide availability of contingency fee arrangements 
by claimant lawyers24 and the fact that expert fees and other outgoings may be 
absorbed by these lawyers.  This approach which offers a ‘free ride’ to claimants is 
particularly prevalent in class actions.   
 
It would be wrong to assume that this system guarantees complete involvement by 
all prospective victims in the claim and thus offers the most just and, subject to a 
threshold of harm necessary to enter the class, the most efficient approach.  General 
inertia; suspicion of lawyers even if they are offering a ‘free lunch’ and opportunity 
cost (even the most efficient system will require the claimant to do something in 
connection with the claim when they could be doing something else) will cap 
involvement.  
 
Whatever, the limitations, it seems in accordance with common sense that ‘opt out’ 
procedures are likely to maximise involvement in a class action while involvement in 
an ‘opt in’ group actions will inevitably be limited.  Mulheron’s report reviews the 
limited empirical evidence in both common law and civil law systems and reports on 
a very striking difference between rates of participation between the two regimes with 
‘opt in’ being markedly less inefficient in involving claimants with potentially good 
claims.  Mulheron suggests that a move towards ‘opt out’ i.e. a class action of some 
nature, is a necessary solution to resolve the ‘unmet need’ for reform of collective 
redress mechanisms in English civil procedure.  
 
                                                          
24
 A contingency fee like a CFA is dependent on the result of the claim.  However, a 
contingency fee is not based on a multiplier of normal fees but a percentage of damages 
Lincoln Law School A Report for BERR  
 
34 
4.7. Funding Issues & Cost Mitigation: the Key Issue 
 
The difficulty with this debate is that it only takes the argument so far, ‘opt out’ (Class 
Actions) may be more efficient in aggregating good claims than ‘opt in’ (Group 
Actions) but this is far from the end of the matter.  The concerns over costs noted 
above go to the heart of the argument between proponents of class actions and 
group actions and has not yet been comprehensively addressed.   
 
Class actions take place in the USA in an effective regime of no cost peril for 
members of the class.  Entrepreneurial lawyers act as agents for the class at their 
own risk (at least in respect of opportunity costs and outgoings).  To create a new 
‘opt out’ class action procedure in England without addressing the question of costs 
would create a massive anomaly.  If the normal ‘costs follow the event’ rule were 
maintained then this is satisfactory if the case is won.  However, if the case is lost 
who pays the costs?  While the claimant class might be insured against liability this is 
theoretical as ATE insurance has proved to be very difficult to obtain in group actions 
because of the greater and more unpredictable risk.  Third Party Funding might be 
available but at a high cost.  Is it just to force a party who might be willing to ‘opt in’ 
and take the cost risk into a class where the funder will take 40%?25 
 
It seems that creation of an ‘opt out’ system would require a comprehensive limitation 
to the ‘cost follows the event’ rule.  There are two approaches that could be adopted 
within the current civil procedural environment: neither are satisfactory for this 
purpose.  
 
Protective cost orders26 allow claimants bringing cases against public authorities or 
public authorities without funds to apply to the court for the costs of the action to be 
capped or for them to be indemnified against costs entirely.  These orders are 
intended to be exceptional and to recognise that some types of litigation are in the 
public interest and should not be constrained by cost pressures.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
recovered.  This type of fee is not currently legal in England where a case has been issued in 
the court. 
25
 This is, of course, similar to the position in the USA where claimant lawyers take their costs 
out of the damages pot before it is shared amongst the class.  However, their cut is 
contractually and judicially controlled and likely to be lower as there is no requirement to 
obtain an indemnity against costs if the case is lost. 
26
 R (Corner House Research) v Secretary of State for Trade & Industry [2005] EWCA Civ 
192 and R v Lord Chancellor ex p Child Poverty Action Group [1999] 1 WLR 347 
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Cost capping is available to the courts in a wider range of civil litigation where there 
is a danger that costs are likely to be disproportionate.27  In effect they impose a 
budget on the case so that parties know the extent of their cost risk.  The courts have 
been reticent in ordering them and they are unlikely to be ordered before or at the 
start of litigation. As such they leave an uncertain cost risk. 
 
Outside public interest litigation it must be questioned whether it is just for 
defendants, such as manufacturers in a collective consumer case, to face a case in 
which, even if they win, they cannot recover their costs.  In a sense this could appear 
to decide the case before it starts as no economically rationale defendant would 
defend a case if the costs of winning are disproportionate.  This threat of ‘losing even 
if winning’ was a concern of defendants under the legal aid system and this might be 
seen to have been resolved by the introduction of CFAs backed by ATE insurance or 
other methods of funding.  However, in a major collective action, assuming that 
insurance or funding can be obtained, there must be a fear that at the conclusion of 
the case cost protection is not available when it is called upon.28 
 
A partial solution to this issue might be to extend the security of cost jurisdiction29 to 
certain group actions.  While, it is axiomatic that individuals cannot be debarred from 
issuing proceedings on the ground that it is suspected that they could not meet an 
adverse cost order30 this does not apply to companies if there is evidence that they 
are in financial difficulties; for example, that they are in administration.  There may be 
an argument that the court should be able to inquire into the bona fides of a group’s 
insurance or funding support before allowing the group to proceed or to proceed on 
terms.  
 
Alternatively, actions brought by representative bodies might be protected from the 
normal liability of paying the other party’s case if the case is lost in any event.  This 
would be an effective way of increasing civil access to justice but as stated above the 
balance between the rights of claimants and defendants would be disturbed.    This 
                                                          
27
 Smart v East Cheshire NHS Trust [2003] EWHC 2806 QB "that there is a real and 
substantial risk that without such an order costs will be disproportionately or unreasonably 
incurred; and that this risk may not be managed by conventional case management and a 
detailed assessment of costs after a trial; and it is just to make such an order"  
28
 Some litigation insurers are based on jurisdictions outside the UK where regulation may not 
be as strict.  As stated Third Party funders are currently unregulated and do not have capital 
requirements. 
29
 A requirement that a claimant has to deposit funds or a guarantee by way of a bond so that 
in the event they lose the case they can meet the other party’s costs. 
30
 Reflecting the Article 6 right to a fair trial. 
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problem can be addressed in various ways including the use of cost capping.  The 
more effective shield of a protective cost order is legitimate in public interest litigation 
because of the potential engagement of human rights and the regulatory function of 
judicial review.  Very few consumer cases, even of collective interest, necessarily 
have such a strong public interest.  For those that do, perhaps involving product 
safety or financial scams, there may be an emerging model in the court’s attitude to 
environmental cases.  Mr. Justice Sullivan in a recent report31 draws the conclusion 
that the cost of procedures impede access to justice and there is some suggestion 
that protective costs orders are becoming more common.32 Ultimately either cost 
protection must be available to protect the representative body (assuming it 
indemnifies the individual claimants) or in the process of registering representative 
bodies they must pass a test of financial viability.  Outside the public sector this will 
be a high hurdle. 
 
4.8 Cost Incentives 
 
The other side of the coin of worrying about mitigating costs is whether costs are 
enough?  In the method of funding under a CFA lawyers will be paid on a basis that 
is affected by the result as the following table demonstrates: 
 
Nature of Cost 
Arrangement 
with Client 
Effect of Success/No 
Success (As defined in 
Arrangement) 
Recoverable from 
Losing Party  
Hourly Rate of 
Charge 
Variable according to 
success usually with a 
minimum charge.  May be 
reduced to nil if no 
success and no recovery 
from the other party 
All or part may be 
recoverable (Subject to 
Court Assessment and/or 
negotiation between 
parties)  
Success Fee  Variable as a multiplier of 
hourly charge. Not 
chargeable if no success.  
All or part may be 
recoverable in addition to 
hourly charges(Subject to 
Court Assessment and/or 
negotiation between 
                                                          
31
 Ensuring Access to Environmental Justice in England & Wales. 
http://www.wwf.org.uk/filelibrary/pdf/justice_report_08.pdf 
32
 Litigation Funding Issue 56, August 2008, page 17. 
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parties) subject to a 
maximum of 100% of the 
hourly charges 
  
 
It follows that the law firm’s reward for taking on a case is an increase in its normal 
charges not as in the USA contingency fee system a percentage of the damages 
recovered.  In some group actions this may operate as a dis-incentive as the work 
involved may be relatively limited and therefore the success fee will be limited but the 
chance of success may also be limited.  This reduces the firm’s propensity to take 
the risk because of the risk/reward ratio.  Conversely if the damages at stake were 
high and the work to achieve them was relatively limited then under a contingency 
fee system the risk (of unrecoverable legal charges by the firm) might be worthwhile.  
This is not to suggest that lawyer’s will not take on cases but simply to note that the 
decision to do so is a complex one and the merits of the case are only part of a 
complex matrix. 
 
4.9. Collective Actions Proceeding by way of a Representative/Specified 
Body 
 
An alternative to groups of consumers acting together is for a body to act for them in 
bringing cases.  It is anticipated that such bodies in taking on cases and in deciding 
how to resolve them would take into account both the claimants interests and the 
wider public interest.  In this way some of the mechanics of the ‘opt in/opt out’ debate 
can be avoided.  A representative body while not bringing cases in respect of 
theoretical losses could be more flexible in recognising that both individuals and the 
wider community may have suffered from a defendant’s default. 
 
Closer to home actions can now be brought under the Enterprise Act 2002 for 
damages for anti-competitive actions.  This requires an organisation to apply to be 
recognised as a specified body of which the Consumer Association (‘Which?’) is the 
only current example.  The difficulties that the Consumer Association met in obtaining 
specified body status and the challenges that it met in bringing its first case (in 
respect of overpriced football shirts) are important exemplars.33  The involvement of 
                                                          
33
 It is understood that third party funding was not available in this case because there were 
insufficient claimants joining the claim by opting in. 
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the Consumer Association in trading activities, although ultimately resolved, did raise 
difficulties. The case itself was a ‘follow on’ case in which a finding had already been 
made that there had been anti-competitive conduct.  The following news reports, 
repeated at length to make the point clear, suggest that even where liability is 
manifest there will still be difficulties: 
 
Philippe Ruttley, a partner at City firm Clyde & Co, acted for consumer group 
Which? in settling the first representative action brought at the Competition 
Appeal Tribunal. It was against JJB Sports, which had already been found to 
have fixed the prices of certain football shirts, including England shirts. There 
were an estimated two million affected consumers, and Mr Ruttley said plenty 
opted in to the action – they cut off the list of named claimants at 400 to make 
the case controllable. Though Mr Ruttley recognises that opt-out can make 
the complaint much larger, and thus easier to get off the ground, ‘opt-in 
makes it more manageable, if more cumbersome’. The case was run on a 
CFA, but after-the-event insurers balked, even though liability was not an 
issue.34  
 
This was followed by: 
 
I write regarding the recent news article … in which you reported comments 
from Philippe Ruttley of Clyde & Co about the representative action taken by 
Which? against JJB Sports. 
 
The article states that ‘plenty’ of affected consumers opted in to the action but 
that Clyde & Co ‘cut off the list of named claimants at 400 to make the case 
controllable’. This is not in fact correct. All claimants who came forward to join 
the action were represented in the case, and there was no point at which we, 
or Clyde & Co, ‘cut off’ the list of claimants.   
 
As your article reports, there were an estimated two million consumers 
affected by the price-fixing of football shirts by JJB Sports and others. The 
fact that the participants in the case were numbered in the hundreds is a 
direct result of the difficulties in bringing these types of compensation claims. 
The passage of time between the overcharging and the action, and the 
relatively small amount of compensation, being just two examples. 
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 ‘Class Actions will make claims easier’ Law Society Gazette, 2008  
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Despite this, the agreement reached with JJB Sports was a good deal for all 
of the affected consumers. Those who did not join the case still have the 
opportunity to claim £10 compensation by taking their shirt or proof of 
purchase into a branch of JJB Sports.  
Dr Deborah Prince, head of legal affairs, Which?35 
 
These reports vividly illustrate the very real difficulties of group litigation in what can 
be seen as the clearest type of case where liability is not in issue.   
 
How far could this model be adapted to be used for consumer redress? Here we 
must speculate in uncertain territory.  Assuming that the costs and funding issues 
could be resolved and appropriate powers were available (which does not appear to 
be currently the case) then could and should representative bodies be available to 
take up the cudgels on behalf of consumers.  The advantage of this approach is that 
representative bodies will take into account the wider public interest in deciding 
whether or not to bring a case and therefore this type of litigation will be less likely to 
attract an accusation of excessive litigation and ‘fat cat lawyers’ exploiting ‘class 
actions’ as is currently hotly debated in the USA. 
 
The coverage of representative bodies should be such that both national and 
regional redress can be addressed. A trader using bad practices and causing injury 
in one region should not be able to avoid redress simply because there is no national 
dimension.  Further, in so far as restorative justice marches hand in hand with civil 
action it is likely to be just as appropriate on the local stage.  Indeed if the model 
involves consumers identifying themselves as an injured group and seeking 
restoration then this may often be based on a community.  
 
Who might such representative bodies be?  The obvious answer would seem to be 
TSOs who are in the front line of identifying and regulating bad practices; collect 
evidence and liaise with the public.  They also routinely co-operate nationally and 
regionally.36  As such they could act both in respect of redress for bad practice that 
affects the whole country or is limited to a local area.  However, our research 
                                                          
35
 A touch of Class’ Law Society Gazette, 13 March 2008 
36
 E.g. Staffordshire TSO took the lead as regulator for the Claims Management Sector.  
Regional scambuster teams bring together a number of TSOs and other organisations.  See: 
http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/consumers/enforcement/trading-
standards/scambusters/index.html 
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suggests that they are unlikely to wish to add to their regulatory burden and their 
concern over being ‘judge, jury and executioner’ under the new regulatory regime 
might be reflected in not wishing to be ‘debt collectors’ as well.  Further, they are 
under resource pressure and are unlikely to be prepared to enter into a novel and 
challenging jurisdiction without fresh resources. 
 
Additionally, TSOs are not law firms.  Their normal model is to enter into 
arrangements with local authority legal services to act for them in cases which they 
choose or are unable to prosecute themselves.  If TSO’s were to act as 
representative bodies then it is unlikely that they would instruct those local authority 
bodies as they in turn are not law firms in the traditional sense but in house lawyers 
acting for a constrained group of clients in the same ‘business’ (local public services) 
and not for the general public.  It is likely that TSOs would tender out the legal work 
to entrepreneurial lawyers prepared to conduct cases on a conditional fee basis on 
behalf of the ultimate client/consumer. 
 
If not TSOs are there other bodies that might fit the bill?  While there is no network of 
local consumer associations as such there are a number of bodies such as law 
centres, CABs regional advice agencies and issue specific charities which might wish 
to offer themselves as representative bodies.  Many will have a national and local 
reach.  However, they differ in their resources and cannot be said to be capable of 
being a network of representative bodies offering the same access to justice to the 
public in each and every area of the country.  Again, very few local organisations 
(apart from law centres) employ lawyers and those lawyers are unlikely to have the 
resources to bring large civil actions.  It seems that private law firms would have to 
be engaged on the same basis as above. 
 
The identification of representative bodies does not produce an answer to the 
question who funds the cases?  While, the law firms will be prepared to act on 
conditional fees in appropriate cases this still leaves the liability for expenses (expert 
fees; forensic accountants etc) which must be met and the potential liability for 
another parties costs if the case is wholly or partly unsuccessful.  As discussed 
above the insurance market is not attracted to ATE cover in group cases.  Third Party 
Funders might wish to be involved.  As discussed at the European level in relation to 
competition damage claims a Contingency Fee Legal Aid Fund to indemnify 
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claimants and instruct lawyers in return for a top slice from damages has its 
attractions and is being discussed at EU Commission level.3738 This model has the 
merit of acting in the public interest but without calling on the public purse (except for 
pump priming) but would almost certainly require legislation to introduce it.39 
 
In so far as all the models suggested above will inevitably involve entrepreneurial law 
firms acting under conditional fees it does suggest that consideration should be given 
to  firms acting not just as agents for agents (the representative bodies acting for 
consumers) but directly for consumers.  This would mirror the US approach of private 
attorneys’ general enforcing public good through private action40.  So far this 
approach has not been attractive to policy makers and the public because of the fear 
of a ‘compensation culture’ and law firm activity has been limited for funding reasons.  
However, in our view such an alternative cannot be excluded from the mix of possible 
outcomes. 
 
4.10   Ombudsmen as Representative Bodies 
 
Ombudsmen are increasingly becoming more active and creative in dispute 
resolution.  Examples of such active agencies are the ACCC in Australia, the Nordic 
Consumer Ombudsmen and the public sector Ombudsmen in the UK who in their 
consideration of complaints can also recommend remedies that consider the effect of 
a practice or decision on others.  This issue is explored further in the analysis of 
restorative justice measures contained in Section 5 of this report.     
 
Further, the Nordic Consumer Ombudsmen (Denmark, Norway, Sweden & Finland) 
in different ways are empowered to act as representative bodies on behalf of groups 
of victims in civil courts.  This approach has much to commend it and would allow the 
public interest to be acknowledged in limiting litigation costs; encouraging mediation 
and adopting opt in or opt out arrangements as appropriate.  Certainly, a consumer 
ombudsman with full or partial protection against adverse costs if the case is won 
would be in a very powerful position to negotiate a settlement with a defendant 
company or companies.  However, such a development in England would require 
                                                          
37
 See A.Riley & J.Peysner, ‘Damages in EC Antitrust Actions: Who Pays the Piper’, 
European Law Review,  2006,  pp 748-761 
 
38
 See footnote 6 
39
 There is some suggestion that the Legal Services Commission may have the powers to 
offer such an approach. 
40
 See article referred to in footnote 32 
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legislative change and changes in the court rules and, perhaps, a change in policy 
approach.41 
 
4.11. A Word of Caution 
 
The debate about maximising the numbers of ‘victims’ who engage (or in ‘opt out’ are 
engaged) carries an implicit assumption that it is inherently appropriate to bring a 
case where there is injury and citizens can obtain redress.  While this must be 
broadly correct it has to be set against societal concern over excessive litigation and 
excessive legal costs where there might be more appropriate methods available (in 
some cases restorative justice) or, in the absence of a broader principle, the loss to 
each individual even if aggregated into a large figure is minor in terms of each 
individuals economic well being.  An example of this is the football shirts case noted 
above.  Each individual was injured to a relatively small extent (the difference 
between the price influenced or not influenced by a cartel) but it was in society’s 
interests for the case to be brought as a further pressure, over and above regulatory 
penalties, to curb anti-competitive behaviour. 
  
This concern is reflected in the Overriding objective under the Civil Procedural Rules 
which states at rule 1 (1)& (2): 
 
(1) These Rules are a new procedural code with the overriding 
objective of enabling the court to deal with cases justly. 
(2) Dealing with a case justly includes, so far as is practicable – 
(a) ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing; 
(b) saving expense; 
(c) dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate – 
(i) to the amount of money involved; 
(ii) to the importance of the case; 
                                                          
41
 For a discussion of the Nordic Ombudsmen (pp 27 to 35) and more generally the 
private/public enforcement debate see C. Hodges The Reform of Class and Representative 
Actions in European Legal Systems, Hart, Oxford, 2008. 
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(iii) to the complexity of the issues; and 
(iv) to the financial position of each party; 
 
(d) ensuring that it is dealt with expeditiously and fairly; and 
(e) allotting to it an appropriate share of the court’s 
resources, while taking into account the need to allot 
resources to other cases. 
 
 
               
This rule, particularly at 1(2) ( c) and (e) recognises that resources of the parties and 
the court should be used efficiently and proportionately and that justice does not 
demand access to the courts at any cost.  This view is likely to be reflected in case 
management by judges in group litigation who may impose cost sanctions against 
wasteful litigation. 
 
All things being equal it might be assumed that if procedure and a cost regime could 
be designed to ensure that consumers with more than minor claims could join 
together to bring cases and they were completely or very substantially protected 
against paying their share of another party’s costs then they would bring such a 
claim.  This assumes that consumers are economically rational agents, in other 
words, they will place a ‘good bet’.  However, it is increasingly recognised that 
individual actions have a strong psychological component which will influence their 
behaviour as the following extracts demonstrate:42  
 
“Theories of choice are at best approximate and incomplete…choice is a 
constructive and contingent process.  When faced with a complex problem, 
people…use computational shortcuts and editing operations”….”the evidence 
indicates that choices are orderly, although not always rational in the 
traditional sense of the word.” 
 
This statement of what is known as Prospect Theory proceeds from a central 
recognition of the non mathematically rational basis for much of human decision 
                                                          
42
 Extracts from P.L.Bernstein Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk, John Wiley, 
New York, 1996 at pages 270 to 278 and 294 referring to numerous papers by Khaneman & 
Tversky. There is an avalanche of recent literature supporting these insights. 
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making: it puts psychological factors as the central determinant rather than a mere 
variant of utility based thinking.  However, this remains in the context that if decisions 
are orderly than they must be to an extent predictable.  The arguments advanced by 
the theory is that the attitude of individuals involved in pricing, game playing or 
negotiation is not an attempt to maximise gains but their need to avoid losses. In one 
example given you go to a theatre having purchased a ticket for $40.  On arrival at 
the box office you discover that you’ve lost the ticket.  Would you buy a replacement 
ticket or miss the show and save $40?  Alternatively, you go to a theatre with $80 in 
your pocket intending to purchase the tickets for $40.  On arrival at the box office you 
discover that you have lost $40.  Would you spend the remaining $40 on a ticket or 
miss the show and save $40?  Classical rational theories of pricing behaviour 
suggest that an individual’s attitude to each dilemma should be the same as the 
mathematical issues are identical.  In fact empirical research shows that more people 
would spend to buy a ticket if they never had one: there is more concerned about a 
loss of an already acquired item than the loss of the spending power.  
 
“…this process is related to the ‘endowments effect’ to describe our tendency 
to set a higher selling price on what we own (are endowed with) than what we 
would pay for the identical item we did not own it…”.in one experiment, 
some…students were given Cornell coffee mugs and were told they could 
take them home; they were also shown a range of prices as to set the lowest 
price at which they would consider selling their mug.  Other students were 
asked the highest price they would be willing to pay to buy a mug.  The 
average owner would not sell below $5.25, while the average buyer would not 
pay more than £2.25.”   
 
The combination of rational economic factors (fear of costs that in practice might not 
be capable of being entirely eliminated); opportunity cost (there are better things to 
do in life than litigate); and these psychological issues suggests that in any system, 
other than one that is ‘clientless’ there is a cap on the involvement of consumers 
even though those that have legitimate grievances which are potentially 
compensatable.   
 
One criticism of USA class actions is that they can sometimes feel like ‘clientless’ 
litigation with the lawyers for the class squaring up against the defendants with little 
involvement by the claimants.  An argument against this approach might be that it 
overstates the extent that individuals might, all things being equal, wish to be 
Lincoln Law School A Report for BERR  
 
45 
involved in litigation.43  Those calling the shots are the lawyers who earn their living 
by conducting litigation and are likely to have a different attitude to bringing cases.  
Policy in the UK needs to take this into account.  
 
4.12. Collective Action and Restorative Justice 
 
The discussion above which focuses on the ‘opt in/opt out’ debate raises a difficulty 
of how either type of procedure might fit with the concept of restorative justice either 
as an alternative to litigation or as a means of resolving a dispute in litigation.  
Restorative justice presupposes a debate between the parties seeking resolution: a 
true meeting of minds.  This is likely to be difficult in an action involving large 
numbers of consumers (which could be either opt in or opt out).  Even more so in the 
generally favoured ‘opt out’ or class model  a substantial part of the group of 
consumers are contingent only and not currently active in resolving the dispute.  As 
the lawyers are not parties they cannot be involved in restorative justice except as 
agents: if ‘opt out’ leads to less involvement by claimants then the prospects for an 
opening for restorative justice is diminished. 
 
4.13. Training and Organisational Needs 
 
The approach outlined above suggests a different set of priorities from regulators in 
this area away from an essentially ‘neutral’ prosecutorial approach to one of active 
engagement with dispute resolution.  This will require a development of a skill set to 
deal with these new challenges.  There will also be a need to examine the 
relationship between different elements of regulatory organisations responding to the 
needs of, for example, restorative justice.  The relationship between, for example, 
trading standards and their in house lawyers, often in a service level agreement, will 
need to be responsive to a different set of challenges, in particular, the need to 
involve the consumer. 
 
4.14. A Provisional Conclusion on Parallel Tracks: A Great Deal of Work 
Needs to Be Done 
 
While the new legislative machinery for consumer redress offers new powers the 
most effective way for these powers to be used and how they mesh with the potential 
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 The counter argument is that ‘private attorneys’ general’ play an important role in policing 
malefactors and if it is impractical to expect clients to take the lead then lawyers should, 
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for restorative justice and civil actions for groups is far from clear.  There is a need to 
generate models of harm to groups of consumer which merit a collective response 
and to stress test different approaches to their resolution in discussion with 
stakeholders.  It is likely that some of these approaches will not be viable within the 
existing statutory and regulatory framework.                                               
                                                                                                                                                                      
subject to judicial control. 
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5. APPLYING RESTORATIVE JUSTICE TO CONSUMER CASES 
 
The basic principles of restorative justice are ‘repair of harm’ and mediation or 
contact between victim and offender which can lead to: 
 
• An apology 
• A chance for victims to get answers to questions 
• A chance for victims to tell offenders the real impact of their crimes and for 
offenders to understand this impact. 
• A chance to achieve some form of reparation  
• A chance for victims to achieve some form of closure from events 
 
The ideal for effective restorative justice is that offenders are held to account for what 
they have done and realise the harm that they have caused.  In successful 
restorative justice victims are able to confront offenders make sense of what has 
happened and move on with their lives.  Successful restorative justice also avoids the 
escalation of legal justice and its associated costs and delays.44 
 
This section of the research considers the read across from restorative justice in 
criminal and other cases to civil cases and consumer redress. 
 
5.1. Restorative Justice and Criminal Justice 
 
Restorative justice is routinely used in criminal justice around the world as a means 
of achieving closure for victims of crime and giving offenders the motivation and 
insight to stop offending.  Restorative justice was introduced into the UK’s youth 
justice system via the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and has subsequently been 
introduced into the adult criminal justice system, although its use is not compulsory.  
As of July 2007, thirteen of the 42 local criminal justice boards had reported some 
adult restorative justice delivery.45  An evaluation of restorative justice schemes 
carried out by the Ministry of Justice46 concluded that; 
                                                          
44
 Marshall, T.F., (1999) ‘Restorative Justice: An Overview’, Home Office 
 
45
 ‘Restorative Justice’, House of Lords, 17 July 2007, Column 126  
 
46
 Shapland, J., Atkinson, A., Atkinson, H., Chapman, B., Dignan, J., Howes, M., Johnstone, 
J., Robinson, G., and Sorsby, A., (2007) ‘Restorative Justice: the views of victims and 
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• 78% of victims who took part in RJ conferences said they would 
recommend it to other victims  
• 90% of victims who took part in an RJ conference received an apology 
from the offender in their case; as compared with only 19% of victims in 
the control group  
• Only 6 victims, and 6 offenders, out of 152 offenders and 216 victims 
interviewed, were dissatisfied with the RJ conference after taking part  
• Around 80% of offenders who took part in the RJ conference thought it 
would lessen their likelihood of re-offending.  
• Victims who had been through a Restorative Justice conference were 
more likely to think the sentence the offender had received was fair, than 
victims in the control group who did not participate in RJ.  
 
The UK research mirrors the belief widely held around the world that restorative 
justice, when carried out properly can have a positive effect on re-offending.  This 
has been demonstrated in a number of research studies (see for example Sherman 
& Strang 2007, Hayes 2005 and Nugent, Williams and Umbreit 2003) although it 
should be noted that success rates vary between offender groups and that different 
models for resolving the conflict can be employed.  Victim-offender mediation, for 
example can be carried out either directly (via face to face meetings) or indirectly 
(where the victim and/or offender do not wish to meet and the mediator conveys 
messages between the two parties to reach agreement).  Family Group conferencing 
can involve the extended family so that the offender has support to address 
challenging behaviour.  Restorative Conferencing involves intervention by a trained 
facilitator to enable a conflict to be resolved and for the offender to find a way of 
making reparation to the victim.    
 
While restorative justice is most often used in crime and criminal justice there is no 
reason why it cannot be used in civil and other cases.  In fact restorative justice 
processes have already been implemented in schools, workplaces, care homes and 
health services where the principles can be readily applied.  Restorative Justice 
Principles are also employed in some ADR and complaint investigation processes 
                                                                                                                                                                      
offenders, The third report from the evaluation of three schemes’, Ministry of 
Justice/University of Sheffield 
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such as Ombudsman schemes where the aim is to put victims back into the position 
they would have been in had the fault not occurred and to allow the complainant to 
find some closure from events.  The public sector Ombudsmen schemes, for 
example, routinely seek the views of complainants when considering a remedy and 
the ‘injustice’ caused to the complainant is a significant factor in determining the 
appropriate remedy. 
 
5.2. Restorative Justice in the Health Service 
 
Restorative practices have been used in the health service with mediation in 
particular being used as a means of conflict resolution and to prevent the escalation 
of clinical negligence cases.47  Turner’s (2006) analysis of health mediation cases 
identified how meetings between NHS staff and patients and their representatives 
can often lead to a satisfactory resolution to cases that might otherwise escalate.  In 
one case involving a man whose wife died after what he saw as a series of errors 
and negligence by her GPs, meetings between the widower and the GPs facilitated 
by a mediator who had first met each party separately, resulted in the widower 
deciding not to pursue the complaint through the NHS Complaints Procedure or by 
other action.48  The use of mediators in health service complaints provides for both 
sides in a dispute to understand the position of the other side and for cases to be 
resolved without the need for litigation.  In its 2007 annual report the National Health 
Service Litigation Service (NHSLA) reported that “96% of clinical negligence cases 
handled by the NHSLA are resolved through negotiation, mediation and other forms 
of alternate dispute resolution.”49    
 
5.3. Restorative Justice in Schools 
 
Research has shown that restorative justice can be used effectively in schools to 
deal with problems ranging from bullying to poor classroom discipline.  In Australia, 
restorative justice schemes were introduced at Queanbeyan South Primary School in 
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 Turner, A., and Eaton, R., (2004) ‘Towards a National Health Service Mediation Scheme’, 
West Kent NHS and Social Care Trust 
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 Turner, A., (2006) ‘Health Mediation Case Studies which worked’, Kent Health Mediation 
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 NHSLA, (2007) ‘The National Health Service Litigation Authority: Report and Accounts 
2007’, NHLSA 
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New South Wales to deal with a range of problems50.  The school was struggling with 
bullying and anti-social behaviour and so introduced a restorative justice scheme to 
deal with this.  Pupils were asked to reflect on their behaviour and the harm that they 
had caused to others, forcing students to meet face-to face with their victims and 
involving staff as mediators to identify solutions.  Staff worked with a restorative 
justice script, the last question of which asked the offender ‘What do you think you 
need to do to make things right?”  This might be an obvious application of restorative 
justice, dealing as it does with a crime that in some circumstances is similar to the 
assaults and harassment dealt with by the criminal justice system.  But the school 
also used restorative justice in a case where children had sold fake raffle tickets to 
senior citizens and were required to pay back the money and perform gardening for 
an elderly woman as restitution.   A similar approach has been applied in the UK.   
 
Restorative Principles are being employed by Lewisham Council in partnership with 
Lewisham Action on Mediation (LAMP).  The work of the Lewisham Restorative 
Approaches Partnership has been instrumental in applying restorative principles in 
five Lewisham schools as a tool for dealing with conflict within them.  In 2004 the 
Scottish Executive established a 30-month project in Restorative Practices in three 
local authority areas.  The pilot project was later extended to 2008.  Restorative 
practices were applied across 18 schools and the report on the project concluded 
that the atmosphere in the primary and special schools became calmer and pupils 
more positive about the school experience.  A small number of schools also “raised 
attainment and in several there was a decrease in exclusions, in-school discipline 
referrals and out of school referrals” the report also concluded that “there was clear 
evidence of children developing conflict resolution skills.”51 .   
 
5.4. Restorative Justice in Ombudsmen’s Schemes 
 
Ombudsman’s schemes are now an established feature of consumer redress and the 
alternate dispute resolution system in the UK.  The National Consumer Council 
estimates that in 2006/2007 the combined efforts of the various Ombudsmen’s 
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schemes resulted in the resolution of nearly 150,000 cases.52  Public sector 
Ombudsmen operate under statute and are funded by the taxpayer while private 
sector Ombudsmen (mostly operating in the goods and services sector) are funded 
by industry participants who elect to join a scheme covering their industry.  However, 
both types of scheme represent a move towards a more consensual form of dispute 
resolution with the Ombudsman employing an inquisitorial rather than an adversarial 
investigative process.  The emphasis is often on fact-finding prior to the Ombudsman 
reaching a decision on the complaint.  But the process allows for the complainant to 
put forward their complaint as they see it and provide detail on the effect that the 
events complained of have had on them.  In public sector cases the public body that 
is being complained of is normally informed of the complainant’s version of events 
and is given an opportunity to respond and address the alleged fault and harm.   
Where the Ombudsmen depart from ‘pure’ restorative justice is in the respect that 
they decide the appropriate remedy for each complaint and while the views of the 
complainant are considered, the Ombudsmen are not bound by them.  The public 
sector Ombudsmen can, therefore, determine that a complaint has been settled and 
that the offending public body has offered an appropriate remedy even though the 
complainant may disagree and be unwilling (or unable) to accept the Ombudsman’s 
judgement on their complaint.  But despite this issue relating to the final decision, 
many restorative principles are employed by the public sector Ombudsmen (and the 
Housing Service Ombudsman) and their investigative practices provide some 
indication of how restorative practices can be applied to an alternate dispute 
resolution setting enacted by legislation.   
 
The Local Government Ombudsmen investigate maladministration by public 
authorities (mostly councils but also national parks authorities and the Environment 
Agency in respect of flood defences) using powers granted under the Local 
Government Act 1974.  Complaints can be made by members of the public about any 
aspect of local authority decision-making and where the Ombudsmen find fault by the 
authority they “seek a remedy that would, so far as possible, put the complainant 
back in the position he or she would have been in but for the fault.”53  When making a 
complaint to the Ombudsman complainants are specifically asked what they believe 
the council should do to put things rights.  Apologies are a common outcome of 
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Ombudsmen’s cases and complaint forms which include the complainant’s proposal 
for remedying their complaint and their view of what has happened and how it has 
affected them are usually sent to the authority when a complaint investigation is 
initiated.  The Ombudsmen also take account of the views of complainants in 
determining a remedy for complaints although they are not bound by the 
complainant’s view. 
 
Examination of casework published by the Ombudsmen demonstrates how 
restorative practices are implemented in their investigative work.  The following 
examples contain elements typical of Ombudsmen’s casework.  The names of the 
complainants used here are not their real names54: 
 
Case Example - Incorrect Advice about Building Regulations 
In a case involving incorrect advice and a failure to carry out building regulations the 
Ombudsman recommended that a council should reimburse ‘Mr and Mrs Archer’ for 
the reasonable costs of the work they carried out following the Council’s incorrect 
advice.  The Council agreed to carry out this recommendation in consultation with Mr 
and Mrs Archer regarding the costs.  The Council also agreed to pay Mr and Mrs 
Archer £500 for the inconvenience arising from the incorrect advice and the 
Ombudsman recommended that the Council should pay Mr and Mrs Archer a further 
£500 for their time and trouble and the needless inconvenience that arose. 
(Ombudsman’s Report reference 04/C/16327)55       
 
Case Example - Planning Special Educational Needs 
In an education case there were failings in the way a council dealt with the transfer of 
the complainant’s daughter who had Special Educational Needs (SEN) and failings in 
the issuing of her SEN statement.  The Ombudsman identified a number of serious 
faults concluding that as a result of the failures the complainant’s daughter ‘Helen’ 
was denied a place at her preferred school for just over a term, being educated at 
home during that period.  The Ombudsman recommended that the Council should 
pay her father ‘Mr Parry’ £1,000, and in discussion with Helen, purchase educational 
assistance to the value of £500 to help her make up the schooling she had lost and 
should review its procedures for dealing with children with a statement of special 
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educational needs who were transferring to secondary school, to ensure that their 
transfers were dealt with in accordance with the law and the Special Educational 
Needs Code of Practice. 
(Ombudsman’s Complaint reference 03/B/8725)56 
 
Although not a formal restorative justice process where both sides in the dispute 
meet as a matter of course, each case involved the complainant in the 
implementation of the remedy, with the Council being required to consult Mr and Mrs 
Archer about the costs of their works and direct discussion with Helen (Mr Parry’s 
daughter) about the educational assistance that she would need to make up for her 
lost schooling.  In each of the above cases the nature of the events meant that it 
would be impossible to put the complainant back in the position that they would have 
been in had the maladministration not occurred and so the Ombudsman has 
recommended an element of financial compensation.  Recognition of the time, 
trouble and inconvenience to which the complainant has been put by way of financial 
compensation can often go some way to helping a complainant believe that they 
have been listened to and that an attempt has been made not only to repair the harm 
caused to them by way of a remedy but also to address their inconvenience.  This 
can help them to achieve closure.    
 
The Independent Housing Ombudsman (IHO) investigates complaints about 
registered social landlords (RSLs).  Unlike the other public sector Ombudsmen the 
IHO has powers to make orders as well as recommendations but also has powers to 
adjudicate on the basis of the papers, adjudicate with a hearing, conciliate, and 
mediate and to make an early neutral assessment.  Restorative Justice has been 
proposed as part of the new regulatory system for social housing.  The IHO has 
endorsed this proposal explaining that this would, for example, allow tenants to call 
their landlord to a public meeting chaired by the IHO at which tenants could air their 
grievances and hear their landlords’ responses.  At the conclusion of the meeting all 
parties would agree an action plan and this would be enforceable by the IHO under 
existing or extended powers.57  Like the other public sector Ombudsmen the IHO 
asks the complainant from the outset to identify what action they believe is necessary 
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to remedy their complaint, employing restorative practices by allowing complainants 
to have a stake in identifying the appropriate remedy for their complaint.  
 
The Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman investigates complaints about 
government departments, agencies and some public bodies as well as poor 
treatment or service provided through the NHS in England.  Where the Ombudsman 
finds fault the body subject of the complaint is asked to provide an explanation and 
acknowledgment of what went wrong and to take action to put the matter right, 
including providing an apology.  Where serious faults are found, organisations are 
asked to make changes to their procedures to prevent others being similarly affected 
and may be asked to pay compensation for any financial loss, worry or 
inconvenience that a complainant has suffered.  
 
Complaints to the Public Sector Ombudsmen, therefore provide some indication of 
how restorative justice principles can be implemented by a regulator following 
investigation of a complaint.  While the resolution of complaints may not be a ‘pure’ 
restorative practice as ultimately, the Ombudsman makes the decision on what is an 
appropriate remedy and agreement between both sides may not be achieved, 
adjudication by the Ombudsman allows both sides input into the decision-making 
process and the opportunity to put their views forward.   If the additional powers for 
enforcers contained in the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Bill are 
implemented the model provided for by Ombudsmen’s schemes provide some 
practical guidance on how restorative principles might be applied to the investigation 
and enforcement of consumer cases.    
 
5.5. Restorative Practices and Consumer Redress Cases  
 
In the House of Lords’ debate on Restorative Justice, Lord Thomas commented on 
the effectiveness of restorative justice when compared with traditional forms of 
criminal justice, concluding that the aims of reduction of crime, rehabilitation of 
offenders and the making of reparation by offenders to their victims contained within 
the Criminal Justice Act 2003 had not been met.  Lord Thomas commented that:   
 
“It is interesting to compare the aims of that Act with the Macrory report 
published by the Better Regulation Executive a year ago. That report 
considered the purposes of sanctions for regulatory offences. The first aim 
was not punishment but changing the behaviour of the offender. The second 
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aim was to eliminate any financial gain or benefit from non-compliance. The 
third aim was to be responsive and to consider what is appropriate for the 
particular offender. The fourth aim was for sanctions to be proportionate to 
the nature of the offence and the harm caused. Your Lordships will see that in 
the aims set out in the report, there is no mention of punishment simply for its 
own sake. Unfortunately, the report’s recommendation that restorative justice 
techniques be applied in this field has not been carried into the Regulatory 
Enforcement and Sanctions Bill introduced on 8 November.” 
 
However, despite Lord Thomas’s comments, the provisions of the Regulatory 
Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 do allow for the application of restorative 
practices in consumer cases.  The Act contains provisions allowing for the 
introduction of fixed financial penalties, for enforcers to accept undertakings from 
offenders, for enforcers to use discretionary measures which could provide for 
restorative practices to be employed by enforcers.  What will determine how effective 
these measures are in contributing to the development of a restorative enforcement 
culture in consumer cases is how they are used by enforcers and regulators.  It is 
accepted in restorative criminal justice practices that the aftermath of a crime cannot 
be fully resolved for the parties without facilitating their personal involvement and that 
justice measures need to be flexible and responsive to the circumstances and 
personal needs relevant to each case.58  Adopting the same principles in consumer 
protection cases would require a more flexible approach on the part of enforcers and 
the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 would appear to reflect this aim.  
In particular, the enforcement undertakings and discretionary requirements provide 
scope for enforcers to require traders and businesses to take steps that will repair the 
harm their actions have caused to consumers.  Given the success of restorative 
principles in some other non-criminal justice settings its application to consumer 
cases could provide for more effective consumer redress by providing for reparation 
and a more consumer-orientated approach to enforcement rather than an 
enforcement regime based on punitive rather than corrective measures.   
 
Research by the National Consumer Council identified that there are in the region of 
202,257 consumer complaints made annually in areas where there is no formal 
independent redress mechanism available by way of an Ombudsman’s scheme.59  
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This includes key consumer complaints areas of second-hand cars, personal 
computers, software and services, large domestic appliances and the audiovisual 
industry.  While some of these areas might be dealt with by way of a complaint to 
TSOs, this brings with it the problem that some cases are discontinued as not being 
in the public interest, cases are enforced in line with local trading standards 
enforcement priorities which may not reflect consumer need, and prosecutions that 
are successful can still result in a dissatisfied consumer who does not directly receive 
redress for their complaint.  While an offender might be convicted and fined the 
consumer may not receive any direct remedy and so may still be unable to achieve 
closure from the experience and could retain a sense of injustice.  In addition 
complainants might be aggrieved and frustrated at the time, trouble and expense 
spent on pursuing a complaint.   
 
While prosecution may be a practical means of dealing with individual offences it is 
an inefficient means of dealing with trade malpractice.  Fines levied in individual 
cases may not provide a sufficient deterrent to prevent future wrongdoing and do not 
address any harm incurred by others in a similar position who may not have directly 
raised a complaint.  As in some areas of crime, offenders may simply regard fines as 
the cost of doing business and criminological theory (see for example Lemert 1951 
and Merton 1968) also explains how many business offenders do not see themselves 
as operating unlawful or criminal practices that need to be modified even when 
prosecuted.  Restorative justice may, therefore, provide a means of changing 
business behaviour by ensuring that business becomes aware of the impact of their 
actions on consumers and the consequences of business practices that breach 
regulations in much the same way that restorative conferencing requires burglars to 
see their victims as individuals whose lives have been severely affected as a direct 
result of their actions.  The application of restorative practices to business regulation 
and compliance is possible where legislation allows enforcement authorities the tools 
to resolve complaints in addition to or as part of their enforcement or regulatory 
activities.  However it may only be possible to apply restorative practices to certain 
cases or complaints and impractical to apply the restorative principles in their entirety 
to consumer protection casework.        
 
5.6. Securing an apology 
 
A core feature of restorative justice is that victims should receive an apology from the 
offender.  In Ombudsmen’s cases, mediated cases and many forms of ADR this is 
Lincoln Law School A Report for BERR  
 
57 
easy to achieve as it can form part of any recommended remedy or settlement of a 
complaint.  But in those consumer cases where there is no directly identifiable 
offender (e.g. a consumer complains about a distance selling or other scam but it is 
not possible to identify a UK-based offender who could be the subject of enforcement 
action) or where a particular business practice contravenes legislation and it is 
enforced by trading standards staff without the need for a specific consumer 
complaint, securing an apology for a specific consumer or group of consumers may 
be difficult to achieve.  As an example, trading standards staff are responsible for 
enforcing regulations on excessive packaging60.  But in some cases (e.g. whisky 
bottles, Easter eggs) excessive packaging has become an established part of the 
industry and is used mainly for brand identification.  In these cases, consumers may 
accept the additional packaging as simply being part of the product and so do not 
pursue a consumer complaint.  A defence also exists allowing retailers to defend 
excessive packaging where it is what the customer wants or where it is required for 
the purposes of marketing.61  However, trading standards might seek to pursue the 
matter even where there is no complainant to receive an apology and so this 
restorative principle might not be achieved.  It is also true that under current 
legislation, prosecutions are taken for breaches of legislation where the outcome 
might be ‘limited’ to a fine and/or prohibition on further trading.  Where trading 
standards or another enforcer is also responsible for facilitating the restorative 
practice this might also be a factor that causes difficulties in securing an apology.  To 
do so might be seen by traders as an admission of guilt that should be avoided if any 
later legal action or prosecution is to be contested.  This contrasts with restorative 
justice in criminal cases where restorative practices might take place as part of 
sentencing (i.e. after conviction where it is seen as part of an offender’s 
rehabilitation.)   
 
But there is no reason why an apology for affected consumers cannot be 
incorporated into the consideration of consumer cases.  When deciding whether to 
pursue a case, the attitude of the offender and nature and circumstances of the 
breach are factors considered by enforcers and regulators.  Certainly the Public 
Sector Ombudsmen regularly accept an apology and the provision of the service or 
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benefit that should have been provided to be an acceptable remedy for a complaint.62  
What may be more at issue in consumer cases is not whether an apology can or 
should be provided, but how restorative principles can be applied to ensure that 
consumers are engaged with the resolution of their complaint and are provided with 
some form of redress appropriate to their complaint. 
 
5.7. Victim-Offender Dialogue 
 
Braithwaite describes restorative justice as “a process whereby all the parties with a 
stake in a particular offence come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the 
aftermath of the offence and its implications for the future.”63 In discussing the 
implementation of restorative justice in criminal justice cases, attention often rests on 
the meeting between offender and victim and as a result the public perception of 
restorative justice is mostly based on this issue, the opportunity for a victim to meet 
the offender and make the offender understand the impact and consequence of their 
actions.  This is in part because the focus in criminal justice is for victims to obtain 
answers and for offenders to face up to their crimes and begin the process of 
rehabilitation, thereby achieving the criminal justice system aim of reducing crime by 
preventing re-offending.    But Llewellyn has argued that “restorative processes are 
founded on a conception of justice as fundamentally concerned with restoring 
relationships”64 There need not be any face-to-face meeting between victim and 
offender but as long as there has been some mechanism through which the victim or 
‘wronged party’ is able to communicate with the offender, even if via a third party or 
mediator, restorative principles could be said to have been applied. This may be 
more important in consumer cases where the consumer may have little choice but to 
continue to interact with certain traders, businesses or suppliers of goods and 
services (e.g. utilities providers) and so an ongoing relationship may exist which is 
not the case between burglar and victim. 
 
In consumer cases, this dialogue might take place via the making of a complaint 
where the consumer’s views are presented to the offender or might be implemented 
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as part of the remedy for example where a company is required to write to a 
consumer explaining what has happened and how it might be remedied.   
 
5.8. Achieving Reparation 
 
Potentially it is in the area of achieving reparation for consumers that restorative 
justice can best be applied to consumer cases.  The core values of restorative justice 
are to secure healing for the victim, responsibility on the part of offenders and making 
amends for the offence.  In consumer cases, this can be achieved as long as 
enforcers and designated regulators have the power to make binding awards and 
pursue negotiated settlements for complaints.  Where legislation provides that 
regulators can decide not to take enforcement action if they can achieve compliance 
through negotiation and settlement with potential offenders; this option could be used 
by applying restorative principles.  Ombudsmen cases provide one model of this 
within the UK.  Where an organisation takes action that the Ombudsman considers to 
be appropriate he may discontinue an investigation.  Legislative changes introduced 
in 2007 mean that the Local Government Ombudsmen, Parliamentary Ombudsman 
and the Health Service Ombudsman, for example can now mediate in disputes in 
addition to securing reparation via local settlements.65  But there are other regulators 
where this is the case and studies of ‘negotiated compliance’ (Hutter 199766 and 
Hawkins 200267) demonstrate how the practice can sometimes achieve better 
settlements and resolution than might have been achieved had an issue been 
pursued to enforcement (or court action).       
 
A model for negotiated settlements exists within Australian consumer protection 
legislation.  The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) has a 
power to use enforceable undertakings to formalise their decisions and to forego 
enforcement litigation if offenders agree to correct their misconduct and comply in the 
future.  Parker (2004) argues that enforceable undertakings represent a means for 
                                                                                                                                                                      
64
 Llewellyn, J., (2002) ‘Dealing with the legacy of native residential school abuse in Canada: 
Litigation, ADR and restorative justice’, University of Toronto Law Journal 
 
65
 Regulatory Reform Order 2007 No 1889 made under the Regulatory Reform Act 2001 
allows the Ombudsman to appoint and pay a mediator ‘or other appropriate person’ to ‘assist’ 
in the conduct of an investigation.   
 
66
 Hutter, B., (1997) ‘Compliance: Regulation and Environment’, Clarendon Press 
 
67
 Hawkins, K., (2002) ‘Law as Last Resort’, Oxford University Press 
 
Lincoln Law School A Report for BERR  
 
60 
applying restorative justice as an alternative to traditional regulatory enforcement 
action because the undertakings can facilitate the agreement of all parties involved in 
wrongdoing to correct a breach of regulations and prevent any further breaches.68  
Parker cites as examples of enforceable undertakings; “the selling of cots, 
sunglasses, bicycles and other goods that do not meet safety standards”69 and 
observed that most offences enforced by the ACCC are civil offences rather than 
criminal prosecutions.  Australian legislation allows that the ACCC can accept 
undertakings after it has begun an investigation and will generally only accept an 
undertaking if there is evidence of a breach that would justify legal action or 
prosecution.   
 
Parker identifies the following criteria in the ACCCs decisions on whether to pursue 
enforceable undertakings: 
1. The impact of the alleged breach on third parties and the community at 
large; 
2. the type of practice 
3. the product or service involved 
4. the size of the corporation or corporations involved 
5. the history of complaints against the corporation and complaints 
concerning the practice complained of 
6. the nature of the product or industry and any relevant previous Court or 
similar proceedings 
7. the cost-effectiveness for all parties of pursuing an administrative 
resolution instead of Court action 
8. prospects for rapid resolution of the matter 
9. the apparent good faith of the corporation 
 
This provides possible criteria for achieving reparation via restorative justice.  The 
provisions in the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 allow for enforcers 
to accept undertakings70 although it is not currently clear whether these would be 
enforceable by the courts.  But in practice, enforcers take such action already on an 
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informal basis as prosecution by trading standards is often a last resort with the aim 
being to secure compliance and punish offenders rather than achieving reparation for 
aggrieved consumers. 
 
The Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 provides a power for enforcers 
to issue discretionary requirements which restore the position to what it would have 
been had the offence not occurred71 and these could be used as a practical means 
for remedying complaints according to restorative principles.  As mentioned above, 
the aim of remedies in Public Sector Ombudsmen cases is to put the complainant 
back in the position they would have been in had the fault not occurred.  Where this 
is not possible compensation is often recommended to reflect any inconvenience or 
loss and the time and trouble suffered by the complainant.   
 
5.9. Closure for Victims 
 
While it may be difficult for some consumers to achieve closure from their complaints 
it is possible to apply the restorative principle of achieving an end to the complaint 
and ensuring that the complainant is satisfied that all issues have been dealt with so 
far as is possible.  However this is not currently the role of enforcement activity and 
so one difficulty with this principle is that it requires a significant change in the role of 
enforcers and regulators and may require a cultural change in how complaints are 
investigated and enforcement decisions taken.   
 
The extent to which a complainant achieves closure can depend on the 
circumstances of the complaint and the action taken to resolve the complaint.  Many 
complainants seek to know the reasons why something has happened that affects 
them.  But in some areas of consumer law it may simply be the case that business 
practices have developed on a cost-benefit basis which makes it more economical to 
ignore or circumvent legislation than to comply with it and any possible negative 
impact on consumers may, therefore, be considered to be minimal, may be ignored 
or may not be considered to be a priority for the business.  While closure for 
consumers may not be possible to achieve what might be possible is a mechanism 
by which consumers are informed that the issue has been resolved and similarly 
affected consumers have also received redress.  Product recall notices provide one 
means of doing this, where a company recognises (or is forced to recognise) that a 
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product will affect all consumers and provides a notice of the action it is taking to 
address the harm to all purchasers.    
 
5.10. Provisional Conclusions 
 
While the principles of restorative justice can be applied to consumer cases it is 
essential that the application is part of a legal justice system rather than an 
alternative to it.  Examination of the practice of restorative justice highlights that it 
requires participation from both the offender and the victim and in consumer cases 
this means that both the trader that is the subject of the complaint and the consumer 
who makes the complaint must engage with the system if it is to work effectively and 
achieve consumer redress.  There are undoubtedly some cases (or types of 
complaint/case) for which restorative justice is inappropriate and where the full range 
of principles cannot be employed and in these cases enforcers should retain the 
option to move to formal prosecution action even though this may not provide full 
redress for the consumer.  
 
The application of restorative justice in criminal justice cases is victim-centred with 
the emphasis on meeting or dialogue between victim and offender and on allowing 
the victim to gain answers and achieve closure.  This is impractical in the majority of 
consumer cases due to difficulties in identifying an offender in some cases and the 
lack of incentive for traders and companies to meet with consumers in others.  But if 
mediation between the parties can be achieved as a possible step to avoid 
prosecution or to remedy a complaint without the need for prosecution this would 
seem to be a reasonable mechanism for restorative principles to be applied in 
consumer cases.  There are, however, possible problems in enforcers being part of 
the restorative process as well as the enforcer who may escalate the matter to 
prosecution if restorative attempts fail.  Making enforcers effectively, judge, jury and 
executioner could impact on the take-up of restorative options such as conferencing. 
 
However, while not a pure restorative justice system, the Regulatory Enforcement 
and Sanctions Act 2008 would seem to allow for restorative principles to be applied 
to consumer cases through the use of enforcement mechanisms that are designed to 
repair the harm caused to consumers (particularly through discretionary restorative 
notices and enforcement undertakings) rather than simply punishing offenders.  But 
for these practices to work effectively there will need to be: 
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• Power on the part of enforcers and designated regulators to make 
binding awards 
• Adoption of the principle that any remedy should be designed to put the 
complainant back in the position they would have been in had the fault 
not occurred or alternatively to consider compensation that reflects the 
inconvenience caused. 
• Engagement with the system by both consumers and traders 
 
What is not currently clear is how far the principles of the Act will be enacted in a 
manner that allows for restorative remedies to be pursued and whether the appeal 
mechanisms would allow businesses to block the application of restorative penalties.  
But in theory at least, there is a clear read-across from criminal justice to civil cases.   
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6. MAIN EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
 
The questionnaire responses and interviews undertaken for this research have 
resulted in some useful data on the views of enforcers, business and consumer 
groups concerning how restorative justice and representative actions might apply in 
consumer cases.  In particular we have received some useful data on the possible 
number of cases involved, the possible value of these cases and practical examples 
of cases to which restorative justice and the option for representative actions could 
apply.  While it should be noted that business remains unconvinced that there is a 
need for these new measures and there does not appear to be a uniform view 
amongst TSOs and enforcers on all aspects of representative actions and restorative 
justice the data has identified a number of issues concerning the application of 
representative actions and consumer protection cases to consumer cases. 
 
6.1. Number of Consumer Cases  
 
Data provided by Consumer Direct, the NCC and by the OFT in its comprehensive 
response has been helpful in identifying the scale of the consumer protection 
problem and the possible number of cases where consumers might not achieve 
effective redress.  The NCC has identified that there are in the region of 202,257 
consumer complaints made annually in areas where there is no formal independent 
redress mechanism available by way of an Ombudsman’s scheme.72  The OFT has 
confirmed that from January 2006 to December 2006, 695,465 complaints were 
recorded on the Consumer Direct Database and in 2007, a total of 819,815 
complaints were recorded on the Consumer Direct database with the top three 
categories of complaint being:  
 
- second hand cars bought from independent traders (41,880) 
- mobile phone service agreements 
- complaints about TVs  
 
Data from the OFT’s database of local authority prosecutions from the 1 April 2006 to 
31 March 2007 indicates that there were 87 prosecutions in relation to second-hand 
cars during the period and just 17 prosecutions in relation to repairs and servicing of 
                                                          
72
 Brooker, S., (2008) ‘Lessons from Ombudsmania’, National Consumer Council 
Lincoln Law School A Report for BERR  
 
65 
cars.  However Trading Standards Officers tell us that even where prosecutions are 
successful and the trader convicted, the consumer rarely receives direct 
compensation or redress for the harm caused to them and so consumers need to 
take their own civil action to obtain redress.  This is discussed further below but 
indicates that there are significant numbers of cases where consumers do not 
receive redress even where enforcement action is taken.  This suggests that there is 
evidence of need for restorative mechanisms or ADR to achieve redress for 
consumers or on the basis that civil actions by single individuals are ineffective then 
there is need for some mechanism that makes it easier from consumers to take 
collective action to achieve redress because even effective enforcement action and 
prosecution of traders does not achieve this for them.   
 
The OFT has provided some data on cases where consumers do not receive 
redress.  This includes: 
 
• Problems in the double glazing domestic market (excluding new build 
applications) a market estimated to be worth around £1.8 billion.73 The OFT’s 
Consumer Detriment Study identified glazing products as one of the areas 
where consumers most often report having to put things right at their own 
expense.74 The length of time that consumers experience problems with 
glazing products was also highlighted as an issue, with 25 per cent of 
problems with glazing products lasting over 12 months.75 There were 11,885 
complaints about double glazing in 2007, with more than half of these (6191) 
regarding substandard services; 
 
• 11,642 complaints to Consumer Direct in 2007 about leather furniture, 
including 8462 regarding defective goods.  (The value of the living room 
furniture market was estimated at £3.86 billion in 2007.76)  The OFT 
Consumer Detriment Study noted that problems with furniture in general were 
considered to be completely resolved in 59 per cent of cases77, leaving 
around 40 per cent of problems either partly resolved or not resolved at all; 
and 
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• Research published by the OFT which reveals that UK consumers lose 
around £3.5 billion to scams every year, with an estimated 3.2 million adults 
falling victim to scams annually.78  This research further suggested that 
consumers lose around £1.2 billion every year to bogus holiday clubs, £490 
million to high risk investment scams, £420 million to pyramid and get-rich-
quick schemes, and £260 million to fake foreign lotteries.  The OFT explained 
that a high proportion of consumers who encounter a scam (38 per cent) do 
not report or talk about their experience, and less than five per cent tend to 
report a scam to the authorities (OFT, police, or local authority TSOs).79 
 
As part of this research an attempt has also been made to identify the value of cases 
to consumers.  OFT research indicates that during the 12 months to April 2008: 
  
• There were an estimated 26.5 million problems where consumers had 
suffered detriment;   
• Fifty-five per cent of problems resulted in a financial detriment below five 
pounds and only four per cent of problems led to detriment levels higher than 
£1,000;   
• The goods or services for which consumers have reported the highest 
proportion of problems are telecommunications, domestic fuel and personal 
banking;  
• The highest average financial detriment per problem is found in the insurance 
category, followed by home maintenance and improvements and personal 
banking; and   
• An estimate of the overall value of revealed consumer detriment in the UK 
economy over the 12 month period is £6.6 billion. 
(Source OFT)80 
 
This research does not attempt to review the data contained within the OFT’s 
Consumer Detriment report.  However discussion of the level of detriment caused to 
consumers and the average values of that detriment during our interviews indicates 
general agreement that the majority of cases relate to detriment levels lower than 
£1,000 as indicated by the OFT’s research.  The main areas of complaint for trading 
standards officers appear to be faulty white goods and brown goods, cars and house 
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repairs.  Counterfeit goods (DVDs etc.) and internet scams appear to be on the 
increase and this is also reflected in the data produced by the OFT.  The nature of 
these activities is such that the detriment to consumers will generally be at the lower 
end of the scale (i.e. under £1000) by virtue of the products and services involved.  
However the evidence suggests that such activities are fairly widespread and 
consumers continue to have difficulty in obtaining redress.      
 
6.2. Restorative Justice – Issues  
 
The preliminary evidence that we received in the early stages of this research 
indicated general agreement that some means of repairing the harm caused to 
consumers by trading or business practices is desirable.  Understanding of exactly 
what restorative justice is varies among enforcers, regulators and consumer groups 
with knowledge of the principle of victim-offender dialogue and compensation shown 
by respondents.  But restorative remedies for complaints need not consist solely of 
compensation and can involve other means of making reparation.  In our interviews 
we explored the extent to which enforcers and regulators might consider remedies 
other than compensation and which truly reflect the harm caused to consumers.  
However the evidence indicates that: 
 
• Enforcers and regulators have concerns about having to take action to obtain 
redress for the consumer and effectively becoming ‘judge, jury and 
executioner’;   
• Enforcers and regulators consider that the purpose of their enforcement 
action is to secure compliance with legislation rather than to punish business 
for causing harm to consumers.  In particular, enforcers consider that it is not 
their role to obtain compensation for consumers and so even with the new 
powers introduced by the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 
restorative justice remedies for consumer complaints might not be pursued as 
enforcers/regulators do not consider that this is their role; 
• Some trading standards officers have indicated that they consider that 
restorative justice would be more suitable for ‘low level’ non-criminal offences 
and should not be used across the board in consumer cases; and 
• Enforcers consider that any restorative penalties should be subject to criminal 
rather than civil enforcement.  The reason given for this is the difficulty in 
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enforcing civil sanctions, with enforcers and regulators indicating that the 
payment of civil penalties and compliance with court judgements is relatively 
low and that little attention is paid to ensuring that traders and businesses 
convicted at court and required to provide redress actually do so.  Enforcers 
indicate that because of this they would be reluctant to use any new powers 
(other than fixed penalty fines) unless there was a clear process in place for 
ensuring that any remedies are carried out.  Enforcers indicate that they 
would not wish to take on this responsibility and would not have the resources 
to do so.   
 
We tested these issues with some 40 delegates during BERR’s restorative justice 
workshop at the Trading Standards Institute conference in Bournemouth on 26 June 
2008.  The results broadly supported the views expressed in the preliminary 
evidence that we had received with most delegates indicating that they held the 
same views.  This is discussed further below.   
 
6.3. Representative Actions – Issues  
 
The evidence of this research indicates a clear need for representative actions to 
achieve consumer redress.  Trading Standards officers confirm to us that even where 
they take successful enforcement action, consumers do not receive redress partly 
because the focus of their enforcement action is not to obtain compensation for the 
consumer (see above) but also because even at the conclusion of a successful 
criminal prosecution or other enforcement action it still requires the consumer to take 
civil action in order to get their money back or to receive redress.  But respondents 
and our own research indicates that there are difficulties with pursuing representative 
actions.  In particular our research has identified that: 
 
• Enforcers and regulators do not wish to take responsibility for taking 
representative action cases on behalf of consumers and there is a general 
reluctance to apply for powers to do so.  Enforcers and regulators would also 
be opposed to these powers being imposed on them and have concerns that 
cases that might achieve easy redress could result in unrealistic expectations 
on the part of consumers that regulators and enforcers can routinely achieve 
redress; 
• Consumer groups would have difficulties in pursuing representative action 
cases.  In general they lack the specialist in-house legal expertise to do so 
Lincoln Law School A Report for BERR  
 
69 
and so would need to employ external legal expertise to do so.  Consumer 
groups indicate that they may have difficulty accepting the liability for such 
cases under the current costs regime and so consider that there may need to 
be some change to the costs regime or may need to obtain some form of 
cost protection insurance.  Consumer groups have also indicated that they 
may lack the resources to fund cases from the outset and so may have to 
employ lawyers as is the case with ‘class actions’ in the US; 
• There is a perception that there would be difficulties in pursuing 
representative actions in cases where traders are based overseas, simply 
disappear to avoid enforcement action and litigation or in those cases 
involving multiple small amounts of money (i.e. a large number of consumers 
suffering a small amount of financial loss or detriment) where the trader 
would not realistically be able to pay any compensation or costs; and 
• Knowledge of their rights by consumers may hamper the level of opt-in to 
cases and so mechanisms to ensure either that consumers are actively 
sought out to join in a representative action or to provide for redress for other 
consumers similarly affected in the event of a successful case are essential.  
 
These issues were explored further during the focus group exercise and in field 
research (interviews and further documentary evidence gathering) for this research. 
 
6.4. Focus Group Exercise - Thursday 26 June 2008 
 
Approximately 40 people attended the restorative justice workshop at the TSI 
conference on 26 June 2008.  Preliminary issues raised during the research were 
discussed with the delegates and were discussed as the following questions:   
 
1. Concerns have been raised about enforcers having to take action to obtain 
redress for the consumer and effectively becoming ‘judge, jury and 
executioner’.  Do you agree with and share this concern? 
2. Respondents have indicated that the purpose of enforcement action is to 
secure compliance rather than punish business or achieve redress for 
consumers.  Do you agree with this view? 
3. Respondents have indicated that Restorative Justice is more suitable for ‘low 
level’, non criminal offences.  Do you agree with this view? 
4. Should penalties for consumer offences be subject to civil or criminal 
enforcement?  
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Each question was asked of all delegates and a head count taken of the responses.  
The results were as follows: 
 
1. Enforcer concerns – the majority of respondents (approx 75%) agreed with 
this proposition and confirmed that trading standards officers have concerns 
about being investigators, enforcers and adjudicators. 
2. Compliance – around 60% of those present agreed that this was the case 
and that the purpose of enforcement was to secure compliance and not to 
achieve redress for consumers.  
3. Suitability of restorative justice – opinion was divided on this question but 
with around 18 delegates disagreeing that this was the case and around 7 
agreeing that this was the case.  A number of delegates did not express an 
opinion.  
4. Civil vs. Criminal – the response to this question was overwhelmingly (90% 
or higher) in favour of criminal enforcement of any penalties introduced by the 
Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Bill [and now contained within the Act] 
or introduced as part of any specific moves to introduce restorative justice as 
part of any new post-Hampton/Macrory enforcement regime.   
 
6.5. Discussion/Analysis of the Results 
The results of the focus group exercise were broadly in line with the views expressed 
in the preliminary research responses and the reasons for this are discussed in more 
detail below.   
 
It is not surprising that trading standards’ officers might believe that any changes 
which introduce restorative justice into consumer protection cases might turn them 
into judge, jury, and executioner and might wish to resist this.  As enforcers, the 
primary role that trading standards officers occupy is one of investigating breaches of 
legislation, identifying the offender and determining whether the evidence is sufficient 
to lead to a successful prosecution and then to consider whether the circumstances 
of the case, the nature of the offense/offender and the impact on the victim justify a 
prosecution.  Trading standards officers interviewed in this research indicate to us 
that the purpose of enforcement action is to achieve compliance with legislation and 
not to achieve redress for the consumer.  So the introduction of additional penalties 
and imposing on trading standards officers the power to determine what the 
appropriate penalty should be represents a change in the focus of their work which 
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could impact on their relationships with business, particularly where they are acting in 
an advisory capacity.  Changing trading standards from enforcers with an advisory 
capacity to enforcers and adjudicators could cause business’ to see trading 
standards as a regulator with powers to impact negatively on their business and this 
could impact on the nature of any negotiation that takes place between business’ and 
trading standards.   
 
The response to the question on restorative justice perhaps reflects the level of 
knowledge of what restorative justice is and the different types of cases that may 
exist within trading standards areas.  During the presentation we asked delegates 
whether they were familiar with the concept of restorative justice and what it means; 
just over half the delegates responded that they were aware of restorative justice.  
This indicates that there may be some misunderstanding about what the penalties in 
the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Bill are intended to achieve and how they 
should be implemented81.  There may also be some difference in how enforcers in 
different parts of the country will implement any restorative provisions and whether 
these might be subject to local schemes.  As the majority of ‘voting’ delegates 
disagreed with the proposition the issue of whether enforcers consider that 
restorative justice is a measure better suited to larger scale and more criminal 
offences is one considered in our assessment of case models but should be explored 
further.  This could reflect the fact that restorative justice is already spoken of as 
being a primarily criminal justice issue and so enforcers cannot easily see how it can 
be applied to non-criminal settings.  This issue is covered in our analysis of 
restorative justice (Section 5 of this report) and in our consideration of case models 
and was also discussed with enforcers and regulators during interviews for this 
research.     
 
It is entirely unsurprising that trading standards officers would consider that any 
penalties introduced by the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 should 
be enforced by criminal rather than civil sanctions.  In its guidance on the Enterprise 
Act 2002 the OFT commented that although consumers benefit from the stronger 
protection and enforcement regime provided by the legislation “consumers who have 
a dispute will still need to seek redress through a court or an alternative means of 
dispute resolution.”82  In our preliminary discussions with trading standards officers 
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and in the consultation responses that we received in the early stages of this 
research, officers expressed concern that there may be difficulties in ensuring that 
any penalties imposed by the courts are actually complied with.  Officers indicated 
that the civil enforcement regime is ineffectual and that insufficient resources are 
allocated to ensuring that fines are paid and/or other remedies are delivered.  
Trading Standards and Regulators do not wish to become involved in pursuing the 
implementation or enforcement of civil remedies and do not consider that the civil 
justice regime is equal to this task.  They consider, therefore, that only through 
criminal enforcement can the implementation of remedies for aggrieved consumers 
be achieved.   
 
6.6. Conclusions from the focus group 
The focus group exercise was useful in confirming that some of the views raised in 
the initial research are widely held by enforcers from different parts of the country, 
there are a number of concerns common to trading standards officers, and a largely 
shared view of their enforcement and compliance role and how any penalties should 
be enforced.  However, the exercise also demonstrated that there are some areas 
where officers may not be entirely in agreement and this illustrates the difficulty of 
attempting to introduce one enforcement regime with common powers where officers 
may have differing views about how and where those powers will be used in practice. 
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7. USE OF EXISTING COMPENSATION OPTIONS 
 
7.1. Overview 
 
One issue raised during our interviews for this research was whether there was a 
need for any new measures to achieve redress for consumers.  As mentioned 
elsewhere in this report (see Section 6) even where enforcement action is 
successfully taken, redress for the consumer may not be achieved.  The report on 
consultation responses on representative actions noted that “in general, business 
representatives were opposed to the proposals. They cited lack of evidence of need 
for representative actions and raised concerns that they could be the first step 
towards American style class actions and a much more litigious culture.”83  In 
interview, business representatives also confirmed that they were not persuaded that 
there was a need for any additional measures and observed that existing options to 
resolve disputes and provide redress were not being used effectively.  Trading 
standards officers, however, have indicated that this is due to unwillingness on the 
part of the courts to provide for consumer redress in criminal cases seeing this as an 
issue for the civil courts to determine.  As any (perceived) flaws in existing legislation 
could impact on the effectiveness of new legislation we have considered this issue as 
part of the research. 
 
7.2. Provision of Consumer Redress by the Criminal Courts  
 
The main provision available to the courts is that of providing compensation for the 
consumer.  While this may not always achieve the restorative justice aim of repairing 
the harm caused to the consumer it is a significant power whose use could resolve 
many complaints where the loss to the consumer is mainly financial.  
 
The opportunity for courts to make compensation orders was originally contained in 
Section 35 of the Criminal Courts Act 1973 (as amended84 which provides a power 
for the courts to make a compensation order.  Under the Powers of Criminal Courts 
(Sentencing) Act 2000 a court, when sentencing, may make an order for the offender 
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to pay compensation to the victim for any personal injury, loss or damage resulting 
from the offence. The payment of compensation should take precedence over the 
imposition of a fine if the offender cannot afford both, and the court is required to give 
reasons if they do not issue a compensation order in any case where it has the 
power to do so.  As the compensation order can be made in respect of any personal 
injury, loss or damage the provision provides scope for the courts to award 
compensation in consumer cases where tangible damage or loss to the consumer 
has occurred.  This could include, for example, those cases where a consumer has 
incurred excessive costs in a transaction with business, where a fraudulent business 
practice has resulted in loss or damage to the consumer (for example where 
damaged or faulty goods have been supplied to a consumer) or where as a result of 
the sale of goods or services the consumer has suffered further loss or damage.  
Theoretically, this provision would allow for compensation to be ordered where 
enforcement action is taken against a supplier of goods or services whose poor 
workmanship or substandard goods and lack of willingness to offer restitution cause 
the consumer to incur additional expense in rectifying the problem.  However, section 
130(4) of the Act says that the amount of compensation should be determined by the 
court with regard to any evidence or representations made by or on behalf of the 
accused or the prosecutor and the evidence of this research is that such 
compensation orders are rarely imposed.  The reasons for this are discussed in more 
detail below. 
 
 
7.3. Assessing Compensation Awards 
 
While the victim does not have to apply to the court before a compensation order can 
be made, in practice the prosecution would need to do so in order for the courts to 
consider evidence of the loss or damage suffered by the victim.  This potentially is a 
significant barrier to consumers receiving compensation as the evidence of this 
research is that enforcers and regulators do not seek to achieve redress for 
consumers through their enforcement activity and so may not put evidence of the 
loss suffered by consumers before the courts.  There is no absolute requirement on 
the prosecution to make a formal request for a compensation order before the courts 
can consider making such an order, but in practice the requirements to consider the 
available evidence and to determine the level of loss or damage before making a 
compensation order means that the prosecution will need to do this.  The court of 
appeal in R v Vivian [1978] held that a compensation order could not be made unless 
the sum claimed is either agreed or simply proved.  The courts do have some 
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discretion, where information is incomplete to make an assessment of the quantum 
to be awarded, however if the claim is challenged the court must hear evidence to 
determine liability see R v Horsham Justices, ex parte Richards [1985] 2 All E R 
1114.  As a result, cases where there is a dispute concerning the exact amount of 
loss to the consumer could result in the courts embarking on complicated 
investigations to determine the exact nature of the loss to the consumer.  The 
evidence of some Trading Standards officers is that the courts are unwilling to take 
this action, instead leaving victims to their civil remedies.  However courts can be 
asked to adjourn the proceedings so that evidence can be called in support of a claim 
although it would be for the prosecution to do this. 
 
7.4. Issues in seeking redress for consumers 
 
The Crown Prosecution Service’s guidelines states that generally an application for 
compensation for damage or loss should only be made where “suitable documentary 
or other evidence is available.” 85  This (and the case law referred to above) 
potentially places the burden on enforcers and prosecutors to collect evidence 
concerning the alleged loss or damage.  Enforcers and prosecutors may also need to 
have sufficient evidence to combat any disputes or challenges to the claimed loss or 
damage raised by defendants in any proceedings.  The preliminary evidence that we 
have obtained on this issue suggests that trading standards officers and regulators 
do not routinely request compensation orders as part of their enforcement and 
prosecutions activity.  While this is an area on which further research is needed, 
previous research by the Home Office and the comments of trading standards 
officers and others indicates the issues that limit the use of compensation orders.   
 
The Home Office conducted research into sentencing in the mid-1990’s86 which 
included an assessment of the use of compensation orders.  While the research was 
not specifically into consumer protection cases it indicates some of the reasons why 
compensation orders are not awarded.  The Home Office report comments on 
previous research (Moxon, Corkery and Hederman 1992) which concluded that while 
courts can make a compensation order (whether or not it is raised in the hearing) 
sentencers were often reluctant to do so in the absence of any evidence that the 
victim was seeking compensation.  The defendant’s inability to pay compensation 
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and the lack of information that would allow the court to assess how much 
compensation would be appropriate were also factors.  Two quotes from magistrates 
included in the Home Office report starkly indicate this problem and are worth 
repeating here: 
 
“How many times have you sat in a court and the defence has objected to a 
value in a charge and the CPS has said, ‘Can we amend that to ‘value 
unknown’?  The minute they do that, that takes out the compensation.” 
 
“I can think of at least one occasion where I refused compensation, or at least 
not to the amount that was claimed, because there was no real evidence.  
The estimate that was before us seemed to be one of these that a mate had 
written for him, so I refused to accept it.”87 
 
The latter quote highlights a problem raised by some trading standards officers 
during this research.  Identifying the extent of harm caused to consumers sometimes 
requires additional investigation and represents a very different investigation from 
simply establishing a breach of regulations and seeking the co-operation of the 
consumer in providing evidence of the offence.  Instead it places the investigator in 
the position of assessing the level of loss, harm and damage caused to a consumer 
which sometimes involves the use of additional experts to evaluate the ‘value’ of the 
consumer detriment and to prepare evidence of this for subsequent court 
proceedings.  Courts may not accept unsubstantiated evidence and the increased 
costs of providing sufficient evidence to convince a court could be prohibitive in some 
circumstances.  An example provided by one trading standards officer related to the 
sale of cars.  In the case of an obviously unroadworthy car it may be relatively easy 
to persuade a court to refund the purchase price to the consumer.  However, in a 
case where there was a dispute about the value of a car, while trading standards 
officers relied on Glass’s Car Values (the industry standard car valuation guide) the 
defendant disputed the accuracy of the valuation and thus contested the amount of 
detriment claimed by the consumer.  As Glass’s does not have statutory footing the 
court is not obliged to accept this valuation and so independent experts may need to 
be employed.  This represents an additional cost for the prosecution. 
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There is also a perception that the criminal courts may view consumer compensation 
as a matter for the civil courts.  The Home Office report notes that it is open to victims 
to pursue compensation through the civil courts and some trading standards officers 
with whom we discussed this issue expressed the view that the courts may be 
unwilling to deal with civil compensation in their cases as they felt it was the role of 
the civil courts to assess such claims.  The Home Office report noted this possibility 
with the following quote from a magistrate: 
 
“The victim has a right to civil action and I contend myself that, if he 
has won in this court, that will stand him in good stead in the county 
court.  That court may be better trained to deal with it.” 
(Flood-Page and Mackie 1998:64) 
 
While this quote should be seen in the context of the sentencing under consideration 
in the Home Office review, the impression remains that this is the view of the criminal 
courts when considering criminal enforcement in consumer cases.   
 
7.5. Summary 
 
The use of existing compensation options is a peripheral issue for this research but is 
outlined here as an indicator for further research into this issue.  Our preliminary 
evidence suggests that enforcers do not routinely ask for compensation orders to be 
issued even where this option is available to them and this will impact on the courts’ 
decisions on whether an order is issued.  The apparent failure to request 
compensation may reflect enforcers’ views that it is not their role to obtain redress for 
the consumer but also reflects the additional evidence and expense required to bring 
a claim for compensation before the courts and to refute any challenges to the 
claimed losses.  TSOs may be unwilling to incur and risk these additional costs.  
There may also be a perception by the courts that compensation claims in consumer 
cases are a civil issue.  However, our provisional findings in this area are based on a 
preliminary investigation of the issue and we would recommend that further research 
is carried out into the extent to which compensation orders are requested and 
granted in consumer protection cases in order to fully assess the existing difficulties 
in this area.  It should also be noted that compensation orders, while addressing the 
financial harm caused to individual consumers may not fully satisfy consumers that 
the harm cannot recur or that there will be a change in business practices.  
 
Lincoln Law School A Report for BERR  
 
78 
8. CASE STUDIES 
 
 
This research has identified that there are a significant number of consumer 
complaints where consumers do not receive effective redress even in the event of 
successful enforcement action.  The flexible range of enforcement sanctions 
introduced under the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 might go 
some way to providing for more effective redress for consumers.  But, enforcers and 
regulators have indicated that they do not see it as their role to obtain redress for 
consumers and that generally enforcement action even where resulting in a 
successful prosecution and conviction for consumer offences does not result in 
consumers receiving redress. 
 
The interviews and evidence that we have collated for this research have identified a 
large number of cases where consumers are unlikely to receive redress.  The case 
examples provided during interview cover a range of different types of consumer 
protection cases and different business practices and highlight some practical 
difficulties in achieving consumer redress even if additional enforcement powers are 
employed.  Our analysis of legislation and the case examples provided to us by 
enforcers and regulators together with our analysis of the literature on representative 
actions and restorative justice has allowed us to develop some case models that 
illustrate the difficulties of implementing these measures. 
  
A 
 
Sale of cars with a built in 3 year warranty (from insurer A).  Conditions are 
such that in practice the warranty can never be relied on.  A tranche of goods 
have been sold and delivered within the last 3 months. Another insurer will give 
a reliable warranty for the balance of the years for £y. per month 
 
Assuming the facts are as stated the case would seem to be suitable for 
collective action as the total quantum of the claim can simply be stated as 
number of consumers x £y x (36 – aggregate number of months outstanding) + 
interest and in turn this readily divided to compensate each individual. 
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In principle this would be of interest to a lawyer prepared to take the case on a 
CFA basis assuming that ATE cover can be obtained and the defendant is 
solvent which as insurer they should be.  Issues of quantum should be simple. 
 
The case is also one that could be suitable for restorative justice by way of the 
trader being required to provide a remedy for affected consumers.  The trader 
could be required to provide an effective warranty for all consumers that will 
allow them to have any required repairs completed under the warranty and 
throughout the full 3 year term.  The trader would also be required to make 
good on any repairs that are required and/or to refund the cost of any repairs 
that have been carried out elsewhere.  Alternatively the trader (or insurer A) 
could be required to meet the costs of the warranty that will be provided by the 
other insurer.   
   
Case A illustrates a relatively straightforward case where consumers have suffered 
similar detriment which could be easily assessed.  However, one issue highlighted 
during interviews is the difficulty of remedying cases where the detriment caused to 
consumers varies and where different faults require different remedies.  This is 
potentially a difficult issue for enforcers should they be dealing with a number of 
complaints about the same trader where it could require detailed investigation of the 
harm caused to each consumer in order that the appropriate remedy can be 
determined.  Case B illustrates an example case of different harm being caused to 
consumers. 
 
B 
 
Sale of kitchen units with fitting included in the price.  Kitchens do not match 
description; contractors are incompetent; units do not fit together even with 
competent fitting.  Each customer would have a different case with different 
characteristics: price; problems with fitting; cost of remedial work; cost of delay 
if kitchen fitting associated with building work. 
 
In principle a case that would be suitable for a collective (representative) action 
but the different harm caused to consumers might make this less attractive for a 
lawyer to pursue.   
 
The case could be one that a representative body (i.e. a consumer group) might 
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pursue in order to establish an issue of concern to a group of consumers (i.e. 
poor service within the kitchen fitting and supply industry and the lack of 
redress for consumers when things go wrong.)  
 
The case could potentially be resolved through Restorative Justice although 
this could present difficulties for an enforcer.  The involvement of both the 
original supplier and a fitting contractor could mean that enforcement action 
may need to be taken against two bodies; clarification of this issue, the harms 
caused to each consumer and the required remedy for consumers may require 
detailed investigation by the enforcer/regulator before appropriate remedies 
could be identified.  (Although the nature of the contract between purchaser and 
consumer may be sufficient that enforcement action solely against the original 
seller is sufficient.) A restorative remedy for the complaint could require the 
supplier to make good on all the problems with the aim of putting the consumer 
back in the position that they would have been in had the errors not occurred.  
This would be difficult where goods do not match the description and so 
financial compensation and/or replacement of the kitchen with appropriate 
replacement goods (e.g. of the same value as that originally ordered) may be 
the only possible remedy.  Where goods have not been fitted correctly the seller 
should meet the costs of remedial fitting and replacement of faulty components. 
Where the consumer has suffered additional costs/delay as a result of the 
errors, financial compensation would be appropriate.   
 
Case B illustrates the difficulties where a large number of consumers have been 
affected by the actions of the same trader but where enforcement action could still 
lead to consumers having to take individual (civil) cases against the trader in order to 
achieve redress.  The legal costs involved for a consumer group should it choose to 
pursue this issue make it unlikely that it would do so although it may be an issue 
where legal action might highlight the issue and where action by a regulator could 
resolve matters for the consumer.  The OFT in its response to this research 
commented that: 
 
”In cases affecting a large number of consumers, the regulator may need to 
act representatively on behalf of consumers (this may require legislative 
changes to allow OFT to do that), although it could be that in some cases a 
representative group of affected consumers could also meet with the trader 
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and regulator in order to agree what actions could be undertaken by the 
trader”  
 
This may not be desirable in all cases and our review of the consultation responses 
on representative actions and the evidence of our interviews is that business may 
have concerns about interest groups being formed solely to bring collective actions 
and pursue a particular issue.  But the OFT suggests that the involvement of a 
regulator to pursue a representative action could be pursued where consumers have 
already grouped themselves together, for example as a pressure group fighting unfair 
pricing or environmentally damaging practices or consumers who have all bought the 
same package holiday.  This is not unheard of in ADR and dispute resolution, the 
Local Government Ombudsman, for example, while mainly considering complaints 
made by individuals also considers cases where a number of affected residents bring 
similar complaints that might be considered via one investigation that establishes the 
facts of the issue and then considers the appropriate remedy to reflect the harm 
caused to each resident.  A new collective action regime was also introduced in 
Denmark which came into force in January 2008.  The Danish rules allow for both an 
opt-in and opt-out model although cases brought using the opt-out model can only be 
brought by the Consumer Ombudsman as the representative of the group.88 
 
There is, of course, a distinction to be made between the problems inadvertently 
caused by legitimate business and consumer problems caused by rogue traders.  
Where a legitimate business inadvertently breaches legislation and causes problems 
for consumers it may be willing to remedy the problems caused to consumers where 
this is brought to its attention. However, rogue traders have a different agenda as 
outlined in Case C.  
 
C 
 
Sale of counterfeit application software for home computers.   
 
The dealer sells mail order and online and the goods are provided either as a 
cheap download or a CD in the mail (without full documentation).  Once 
installed the software often fails to work effectively, is ineligible for any updates 
                                                          
88
 Clifford Chance (2008) ‘Class Actions make their way into Europe’, London: Clifford 
Chance 
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or support that are available to purchasers of genuine software and in some 
cases the software causes damage to computers.  Complaints to the seller are 
either not responded to or the seller simply asks the purchaser to send faulty 
disks back at their expense and replaces them with another (often faulty) CD.  
Refunds are not given and the seller takes no responsibility for any software 
conflicts or problems caused by the defective goods.  Trading standards 
investigate the complaint and decide to take enforcement action.    
 
This case might be suitable for a representative action, but equally could be 
one for which restorative justice properly implemented by enforcers or 
regulators could achieve both redress for consumers and the enforcement of 
legislation.  However, there may be concerns as to whether civil action is viable 
if the seller is not solvent or might go insolvent to avoid liability.    
 
Where the trader is not solvent or becomes so to avoid liability this would also impact 
on any attempt to have the trader or business implement a restorative penalty where 
one is imposed by the regulator.  Business has highlighted to us that there are cases 
where business can voluntarily resolve matters for consumers using restorative 
practices and the provisions of the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 
seem to provide a mechanism for legitimate business to do so in consultation with 
enforcers.   
 
D 
 
Second-hand car trade – clocked cars - large number of consumers affected – 
enforcement action does not resolve all consumer issues.   
 
A complaint from a member of the public leads trading standards to investigate 
a small independent local motor trader.  Trading standards have the car that is 
the subject of the complaint tested and determined that its mileage has been 
altered.  Subsequent investigations determine that around 100 cars have been 
‘clocked’ by the dealer over a three year period, with varying amounts taken off 
the mileage of each car involved.  Trading standards decide to take 
enforcement action against the trader. 
 
Under the ‘normal’ regime, enforcement action even if resulting in a conviction 
for the trader would most likely require the consumer to take civil action to 
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achieve redress.  The case might be one that would be suitable for a 
representative action because there are a large number of consumers (100) 
who have been affected in a similar way, albeit the harm that they have 
suffered might differ between consumers.  There may be some minor difficulties 
in identifying all affected consumers but a representative such as a consumer 
group could potentially identify all consumers who purchased cars from the 
trader during the three year period.   
 
The different levels of detriment suffered by consumers would, however, mean 
that the case might not be of interest to a lawyer in a collective action.  
Dependent on the level of ‘clocking’, some consumers might have paid only a 
small amount more than they would have if the car’s correct mileage had been 
shown while others may, in fact have paid a fair price for the car even though 
the car was ‘clocked’ to make the car seem more of a bargain than actually 
represented.  A suitably designated consumer group might be interested in the 
case but would incur considerable legal fees in doing so and would have to 
bear liability for costs in the event of an unsuccessful action.  While the case 
would in principle be attractive for a consumer group, in practice it is unlikely 
that one would pursue the case.    
 
Restorative justice could represent a means for enforcement action to achieve 
consumer redress.  Under the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 
the trader could accept responsibility for identifying a resolution by way of an 
undertaking to enforcers.  However in the event that the trader declines to do so 
an enforceable undertaking that requires the trader to compensate all those 
who have purchased cars from him for the amount of their loss or to provide 
some other remedy that addresses the harm would be a suitable remedy for the 
affected consumers.  
 
From our discussions with TSOs Case D would seem to be a fairly typical activity 
where a legitimate business (i.e. one that mostly operates lawfully but which has 
some practices which give rise to breaches of legislation) causes problems for 
consumers that are not resolved by enforcement action such as prosecution but 
where the new measures in the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 
could encourage the business to resolve the issue voluntarily (thus avoiding 
prosecution).  During interview business representatives told us that there are 
numerous examples of where business already employs an element of restorative 
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principles voluntarily.  For example in a case where chemicals enter a river and 
cause an environmental problem the business might recognise that it had been at 
fault and in addition to cleaning the river might restock it, effectively repairing the 
harm and returning the situation to what it would have been had the fault (i.e. the 
pollution) not occurred.  Such a solution could be proposed by business by way of an 
undertaking under the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008.  However if 
a business is unwilling to provide a solution or repair the harm caused to consumers 
the enforcer/regulator could introduce a similar remedy as a penalty by way of using 
the discretionary enforcement provisions of the Act.   
 
E 
 
Furniture purchase – defective goods – trader and consumer cannot agree on 
remedy and trader disputes that goods are faulty – no customer service. 
 
A consumer purchased a leather sofa from a trader. Within four months the 
consumer called the trader to report that the leather was peeling off and the 
stitching was coming undone. The trader agreed to repair the goods but the 
consumer refused, requesting a replacement. The trader sends a 
representative to assess the goods, who advises the consumer that the goods 
are indeed faulty. However the consumer then receives a letter from the trader 
stating that misuse of the goods caused the problems and so the sofa would 
not be replaced.  After further complaints from the consumer, the trader again 
sends someone to assess the problem, who repeats the advice to the 
consumer that the leather was faulty, however the consumer again receives a 
letter from the trader stating the problem was misuse and wear and tear. The 
consumer continues to make complaints to the trader but does not receive any 
further response.  The consumer makes a complaint to trading standards. 
 
The case is another one where Restorative justice could represent a means for 
enforcement action to achieve consumer redress.  However, the unwillingness 
of the trader to respond to complaints and to recognise the problem (even when 
his own expert agrees that the product is faulty) makes it unlikely that the trader 
will willingly provide redress.  Any restorative remedy should include measures 
to identify other consumers who have been similarly affected and to also 
provide them with an appropriate remedy.   
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Example E demonstrates the difficulties experienced by consumers when a trader is 
unwilling to offer redress.  While there is a distinction to be made between rogue 
traders intent on exploiting their customers and legitimate business who might 
experience some difficulty with their after sales care, consumers solely want redress 
when things go wrong.  In the Example E scenario, it is likely that there are a number 
of consumers that have been similarly affected although they might not be easily 
identified from one-off complaints.   
 
In cases where a number of consumers have been affected there is therefore a need 
for all affected consumers to receive redress according to the restorative principle of 
repairing the harm.  It is this model employed by the ACCC in Australia (see 
Appendix 2) that illustrates how restorative practices could be employed using the 
provisions of the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008.   But this requires 
enforcers to engage with this aspect of the legislation and to actively employ 
restorative practices as part of their enforcement toolkit.  Such measures are 
however, unlikely to be successful in cases where traders deliberately target 
vulnerable consumers (i.e. illegitimate business) or are based overseas and thus 
outside the reach of enforcement action under the Act as illustrated by Case F. 
 
F 
 
Online Scam – Internet sale of electrical goods – trader based overseas – 
defective and potentially dangerous goods – no sales support.   
 
A trader based overseas sells small electrical goods (mostly kettles, toasters 
and microwaves) online in the UK via his own website and other online trading 
websites.  The goods are sourced in the Eastern European country in which the 
dealer lives but are stored and despatched from a warehouse in the UK.  
Payment for the goods is made online via credit/debit card.  Trading standards 
begin to receive complaints about the poor quality of the goods, goods being 
mis-described and the safety of some of the goods.  Consumers also report that 
when complaints are made to the trader no response is received and 
consumers are simply left with the faulty goods.  Testing reveals that some of 
the goods are dangerous but investigation confirms that the trader is based 
overseas and the UK based warehouse is simply a fulfilment house which 
stores and despatches the goods. 
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This case would not be of interest to a lawyer as a group or representative 
action and it is also difficult to see how a consumer group would be able to 
progress it even though there could be a large number of affected consumers.  
The case would also be difficult to enforce under restorative justice principles 
even with the additional options in the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions 
Act 2008 because the trader is based overseas.  While action might be taken to 
seize any defective goods from the UK location and to warn consumers of the 
dangers the unsafe goods represent, enforcement action against the trader 
would be problematic and it would also be difficult to enforce any judgment if 
the trader declined to make reparation or comply with any judgement.   
 
Scams represent a particular difficulty for achieving consumer redress although in its 
submission to this research the OFT surmised that this was one area where 
consumers “would benefit from an additional redress mechanism in the form of 
representative actions”. Research published by the OFT in 2006 revealed that UK 
consumers lose around £3.5 billion to scams every year, with an estimated 3.2 
million adults falling victim to scams annually.89 
 
This research further suggests that consumers lose around £1.2 billion every year to 
bogus holiday clubs, £490 million to high risk investment scams, £420 million to 
pyramid and get-rich-quick schemes, and £260 million to fake foreign lotteries. 
 
The OFT considers that obtaining redress for scam victims may present particular 
challenges, such as identifying affected consumers and tracing scammers, as well as 
issues relating to the financial capacity of the scammer to repay victims. However, 
there is significant potential for a representative action mechanism to benefit victims 
of scams. 
 
In addition to online scams a common activity among rogue traders who target 
vulnerable consumers is the demanding of money from consumers before orders will 
be completed or remedial action taken in the event of a fault.  This is a theme that 
has emerged in our discussions with TSOs and has been considered in the 
development of case models based on scams or aggressive doorstop selling 
techniques.  Case G illustrates the problem. 
 
                                                          
89
 OFT ‘Research on impacts of mass marketed scams’ December 2006 
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G 
 
Driveway construction – faulty/incomplete installation – trader demands 
additional money from consumer – job either not completed or completed 
incompetently – complaints to trader ignored or company cannot be located. 
 
A trader knocks on the door of a householder stating that he is in the area doing 
driveway and paving work and as a result has some materials left over and can 
offer a discount for other householders in the area.  The trader quotes a ‘special 
price’ for the consumer contingent on them paying a deposit or the full amount 
of the job up front.  The consumer pays a deposit and work is commenced but 
works are substandard.  The consumer raises a complaint and the trader 
explains that he encountered a problem with the job and requires additional 
funds from the consumer to rectify this and will not complete the work until the 
consumer pays the (increased) balance.  The consumer pays the balance 
under duress but the trader either fails to complete the job or completes it to a 
low standard which requires additional remedial works.  Complaints left as 
messages to the trader’s mobile telephone are ignored and after a month or so 
the number becomes unobtainable.  The address given by the trader turns out 
to be a false one and the consumer has difficulty in locating the trader. 
 
This case would not be of interest to a lawyer as a group or representative 
action even though there are likely to be a number of consumers affected by 
what is most likely a way of operating the ‘business’ that causes regular harm to 
consumers.  The business model is such that vulnerable consumers are 
deliberately targeted and so there is little prospect of a successful action 
resulting in any recompense to consumers.  Even if court action can be initiated 
(and the difficulties of locating the trader make this unlikely) such civil action 
would not be viable if the trader were either insolvent or attempted to become 
so in order to avoid liability.  The trader is likely to ignore any court judgement 
even if the judgement goes the consumer’s way, making the case an 
unattractive option for a lawyer. 
 
Similar problems exist in any attempt to pursue the case via restorative justice.  
Theoretically a restorative penalty could require the trader to remedy any 
defects in the original work and/or provide compensation for the additional costs 
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the consumer has incurred while also providing a remedy for other consumers 
who have been similarly affected.  However, even if enforcers are able to locate 
the trader it is unlikely that he will voluntarily agree to a restorative penalty 
leaving enforcers with the option of prosecution.   
 
Finally, there are also problems where the actions of the consumer themselves are a 
factor in the failure to resolve a complaint (although this is not to suggest that the 
consumer is at fault).  Case H illustrates an example where a trader offers 
compensation or a remedy to the customer but the customer refuses to accept the 
remedy and the relationship between the consumer and the trader subsequently 
breaks down. 
 
H 
 
Double Glazing – faulty/incomplete fitting – no sales or fitting support – no sales 
support. 
 
Consumer ordered double glazing and door to be supplied and fitted.  
Consumer was told that she would not have to pay until completion but fitters 
demanded £2245 upfront, which the consumer paid and works commenced.  
The consumer subsequently reported that the fitter had supplied the wrong 
window, there was no frosted window in the bathroom as ordered and the 
surveying had been done incorrectly.  When complaints were made to the 
trader he became abusive and told the consumer that if she continued 
complaining the job would not be completed and they would not fit the window 
and door.  After much complaining the managing director of the company 
offered her £5 compensation for the window, the consumer refused this and 
informed the company she wanted the frosted window she had paid for.  
However the company sent a fitter to look at the window with £10 compensation 
for the consumer.  She rejected this and maintained that she wanted the goods 
she had ordered.     
 
The company failed to complete the job and did not reply to several complaint 
letters sent by recorded delivery.  The consumer telephones Consumer Direct 
and subsequently refers the case to Trading Standards. 
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In principle a case that would be of interest to a lawyer as a group or 
representative action as there are likely to be a number of consumers affected 
by the company’s fitting practices where customers do not always receive the 
exact goods they have paid for.  Issues of quantum should be relatively 
straightforward but where the bulk of the work has been carried out and the 
amount of detriment caused to consumers is relatively low in value the case 
may become less attractive. 
 
Restorative justice undertaken by an enforcer could resolve the complaint.  
However, the company has offered the consumer compensation which they 
have refused and this may be an issue taken into account when determining 
the remedy.  As the company has shown some willingness to provide a remedy 
(albeit a remedy that was considered by the consumer to be inadequate) an 
appropriate undertaking might be for the company to fit the goods that the 
consumer has paid for (the window and door) and to pay a small amount of 
compensation for the inconvenience caused to the consumer.  The enforcer 
could also require the company to provide an undertaking to change its 
business practices and to consider other consumers in the same position.   
 
 
The OFT advises that a common theme amongst complaints about goods in the 
double glazing industry relates to defective goods or poor workmanship, followed by 
inadequate repairs or offers of redress. Several complaints involve the trader seeking 
additional payment above and beyond what the consumer agreed to pay. 
 
Summary of Case Examples 
These cases highlight some of the difficulties of pursuing cases under collective 
actions and restorative justice while also highlighting some areas where cases could 
be pursued via these mechanisms.   
 
Public enforcement is generally preferable to consumers having to pursue civil action 
to resolve complaints.  If public enforcers are able to take effective action to resolve a 
complaint then consumers are spared the inconvenience, stress and expense of 
pursuing a civil action.  Enforcement action by public enforcers can also have the 
effect of changing business behaviour and allow enforcers to work with business to 
achieve compliance with regulations.  However, enforcers do not pursue all cases 
brought to their attention and make judgements about which cases they will pursue 
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taking into account such issues as the attitude of the offender, the nature of the 
breach, the availability of evidence and the resources needed to pursue a case.  
Because of this there remains a need to have in place mechanisms that allow 
consumers to pursue cases that public enforcers decide not to pursue if the 
consumer is to recover any loss or damage caused to them in cases where 
agreement cannot be reached with the business on the harm caused and the 
appropriate remedy for that harm.   
 
However the case examples shown above outline the difficulties that exist where a 
business or trader is unwilling or unable to provide a remedy for a complaint; as a 
result it is difficult to easily determine the appropriate mechanism through which a 
case should be pursued.  Case A, for example could be resolved either by a 
collective action or by a restorative remedy pursued by an enforcer.  The advantages 
of the collective action in this case are that it is a relatively straightforward case which 
allows for a group of consumers to directly receive compensation and has the 
potential for other consumers who have been affected to be identified and join the 
action.  Case B is a difficult one to pursue via a collective action as it would not be of 
interest to a lawyer and so despite the difficulties mentioned above would be one that 
could be pursued via a public enforcer pursuing a restorative justice remedy.  
However, such an investigation may require considerable resources and assessment 
of the harm caused to a range of consumers and carries with it a risk that a trader 
may be unwilling to provide the remedy.  This is also an issue in cases C, D and E 
and the deliberately fraudulent nature of the trading activity in Cases F and G (the 
latter with its emphasis on targeting a vulnerable consumer) mean that public 
enforcement with its punitive element rather than solely an emphasis on achieving 
redress may be necessary.  Case H which indicates a situation where a trader has 
attempted to find some means of resolving a complaint but the relationship between 
the trader and consumer has broken down shows how consumers expectations can 
be a factor in the breakdown of the relationship and may discourage traders from 
making redress.  This is not to say that the consumer is at fault for insisting on a 
particular remedy but the challenge for enforcers attempting to implement a 
restorative remedy in such cases is to find a remedy that is acceptable to both 
parties.  The evidence of this research is that it is this shift in becoming the final 
adjudicator on the dispute (referred to as the ‘judge, jury and executioner’) that is of 
concern to enforcers as well as the difficulty of what to do when the remedy is not 
complied with.  We consider that court enforceable undertakings such as those used 
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by the ACCC would provide a solution to this difficulty as it would allow for 
enforcement of any remedy and provide a level of status to the remedies.   
 
There are, of course, those traders running an illegitimate business who might not be 
deterred either by public enforcement or a collective action and from whom a remedy 
for consumers may be impossible to obtain. However even where the prospect of 
success may be slight against such traders action should still be pursued.  
Consumers require confidence that fraudulent trading activity and/or business activity 
will not be ignored and that some mechanisms exists to attempt resolution of their 
complaint.  It is also important that an enforcement record exists of those businesses 
that cause consumer detriment in the event of future activity.   
   
Further case examples are contained in Appendix 1: Consumer Protection Case 
Data from the OFT and in Appendix 2: Application of Enforceable Undertakings in 
Australia.   
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9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
The evidence that we have received and analysed during this research project 
indicates that there is a gap between successful enforcement action and redress for 
consumers.  If the intent is to provide for greater redress for consumers, introducing 
restorative justice, ADR and/or representative actions into consumer protection cases 
provides a mechanism through which this gap could be addressed.  Trading 
standards officers, consumer representatives and the OFT agree that even where 
enforcement action is properly taken by enforcers or regulators and is successful, 
consumers are often still left without adequate redress and in the majority of cases 
will need to take civil action in order to obtain compensation or achieve some other 
forms of redress.  This puts individual consumers (or an affected group of 
consumers) at the disadvantage of having to seek legal advice and to bear the costs 
of their own legal action.   
 
While there is general agreement that representative actions could provide for more 
effective consumer redress enforcers and regulators indicate that they do not wish to 
take responsibility for pursuing these cases and identify practical difficulties in taking 
representative action cases even if a mechanism to make this option more widely 
available is introduced.  In addition there are difficulties with consumer groups taking 
on representative action cases due to the lack of in-house legal expertise to bring 
such cases and the cost of obtaining outside legal expertise and the current costs 
regime for such cases.  Business has concerns about the possibility of a class action 
style culture being introduced in the UK and the potential escalation of a 
‘compensation culture’.  The issue of ‘success fees’ is also an issue and any 
mechanism introduced for representative actions should not introduce a system 
where fees drive consumer actions (e.g. lawyers should not be able to bring a 
£12,000 action for a £1,000 claim that could be addressed through other means).   
        
However while restorative justice is seen by respondents as being a tool through 
which redress might be achieved for consumers, the initial evidence is that enforcers 
and regulators may be reluctant to use the new tools contained in the Regulatory 
Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008, do not see it as their role to obtain redress for 
individual consumers and have concerns about becoming responsible for doing so.  
Business representatives have also raised concerns about the practical difficulties of 
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implementing restorative penalties and whether a restorative penalty would constitute 
a final settlement of a dispute (i.e. once business has agreed to a settlement and the 
adjudicator/regulator is satisfied the consumer should not then be able to pursue 
further action). The advice giving role that enforcers have is an important one and 
while the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 provides scope for 
business to make an undertaking on how to resolve a dispute or for enforcers to 
employ restorative practices as an enforcement tool, this represents a shift in the role 
of enforcers that has resource implications and which enforcers may be unwilling to 
implement.  There are also concerns about how any restorative measures can be 
enforced and implemented and the overwhelming view of enforcer/regulator 
respondents in this research was that these should be subject to criminal 
enforcement.  
 
Any restorative practice employed as a solution to consumer protection cases should 
therefore be designed to achieve a final settlement of the complaint without the need 
for consumers to take civil action to achieve redress, although to be effective 
enforcers may need to retain criminal prosecution as an option if the attempt to 
resolve the dispute by restorative means fails and there are potential difficulties if a 
business or trader is unwilling or unable to carry out a remedy.  The (court) 
enforceable undertakings model used by the ACCC is potentially an attractive one as 
it provides a mechanism for ensuring that undertakings are carried out and that the 
wider harm to consumers is addressed.  But there are resources implications 
attached to employing such restorative practices and in the event that public 
enforcement fails to resolve the issue there still needs to be a mechanism through 
which consumers are able to take action.  While public enforcement remains the 
preferred option there will inevitably be cases that public enforcers choose not to 
pursue and in these cases, consumers need some option that will allow them to 
pursue action where they have been caused detriment.  We therefore envisage the 
need for a twin-track approach that provides for effective enforcement employing 
restorative justice principles using the additional powers provided for in the 
Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 and an improved facility to take 
collective actions in certain cases. 
 
We therefore make the following recommendations: 
 
1. That pilot restorative justice scheme(s) should be established to 
determine whether there would be increased costs, training needs or 
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other resource difficulties that would need to be addressed by TSOs or 
regulators in employing restorative practices to consumer cases using the 
provisions of the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008.  The 
evidence of this research is that there are practical difficulties in 
employing restorative practices and concerns among enforcers, regulators 
and business about how the measures would work in practice.  
 
2. Consideration should be given to introducing an independent Consumer 
Ombudsman along the lines of the Nordic Ombudsmen who could 
consider representative actions and implement restorative justice to 
deliver effective and efficient enforcement, compensation and redress for 
consumers.  Having such an independent, publicly funded adjudicator 
could result in a considerable saving on the cost of private collective 
actions, eliminate the concerns of regulators and consumer groups about 
the costs of these actions and also address the concerns of business 
about the changed enforcement regime.  We accept that such a measure 
would require legislative change.   
 
3. Even the least enthusiastic supporter of private enforcement through the 
civil courts recognises that there will be cases in which aggregated and 
co-ordinated action satisfies a cost benefit test.90  The approach of co-
ordination through a representative body would seem to meet the 
perceived requirement that the public interest should trump any 
entrepreneurial lawyer profit motive.  However, this begs the questions 
who should be the representative body and can a more responsive 
system be devised to establish representative bodies in advance of need 
or as and when required within a reasonable time scale rather than the 
tortuous process under which the Consumer Association became a 
specified body for competition damage claims.91  Consideration should be 
given to a two stage approach to this issue.  Firstly, a model or models 
should be created to demonstrate the range of attributes that a 
satisfactory representative body, or consortium of registered bodies, 
should display to be able to carry out a cost benefit analysis on an 
aggregated consumer claim; to identify potential claimants and lawyers 
                                                          
90
 C.Hodges ‘Encouraging Enterprise and Rebalancing Risk: Implications of Economic Policy 
for Regulation, Enforcement and Compensation’ [2007] EBLR pp1262-3. 
91
 See paragraph 4.9 above. 
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and to manage the claim as the central client.  This analysis would include 
governance issues as well as resources issues; including the use of cy 
pres techniques to transfer unallocated damages to the general interest, 
including the financial viability of the representative body.92  Secondly, an 
audit should be carried out to identify existing organisations (including 
TSOs; consortia of TSOs; national and local consumer bodies; law 
centres etc) which satisfy the model(s) or by co-ordination, training or 
further resources might be able to satisfy the model(s) in future. 
 
4. That further research is needed into the reasons why the existing options 
for awarding compensation available to the courts are underused.  This is 
an issue cited by business and by TSOs suggesting that there is scope for 
courts to award compensation without the need for consumers to take civil 
action but the option is not being used.  While we have outlined some of 
the reasons why existing options might not be used (see Section 7) our 
analysis is a preliminary one based on limited evidence and we consider 
that further research to assess the issue in detail is required. 
 
While both restorative justice and representative actions may in theory provide a 
solution to the problem of consumer redress the evidence is that despite evidence of 
need there are a number of problems with introducing restorative justice and 
representative action measures and there are specific case models where problems 
may occur.  The Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 goes some way to 
addressing the issue of restorative justice by making it possible for restorative 
practices to be employed by regulators along the lines of the (enforceable) 
undertakings used by the ACCC in Australia.  If used effectively the new flexible 
penalties provide for a mechanism for business and enforcers to find creative 
solutions to consumer problems and for enforcement action to incorporate dialogue 
with business and consumers that will produce solutions that repair the harm caused 
to consumers.   
 
                                                          
92
 This doctrine which originated in the courts of equity deals with the problem of when the 
object of a trust fail (A charity  set up to benefit a school but the school closes down) and 
allows re-allocation to similar objectives.  It has been widely and controversially used in the 
USA in consumer actions to benefit ‘second level’ consumers who may not have been 
individually subject to damage but share an interest in redress.  For a general discussion in 
the context of the US debate  see http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20080404_FrankCAW7.1.pdf 
and http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/archives/files/454.pdf  
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APPENDIX 1 – Consumer Protection Case Examples 
 
In its response to this research the OFT confirmed its view that representative 
actions would be beneficial to groups of consumers who have been unable, for 
whatever reason, to resolve their disputes through direct settlement or alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms (ADR).  
 
The OFT’s Consumer Detriment Study93 found an estimated 34 per cent of consumer 
problems are considered not resolved at all by the consumer, and in around 19 per 
cent of cases, consumers who considered their problem resolved were not satisfied 
with the outcome.94 
 
An analysis of the consumer direct database carried out by the OFT identified a 
number of areas within which case examples that could benefit from representative 
action could be found.  The OFT’s table of these cases is reproduced below as part 
of this report using data sourced from the Consumer Direct Database, specifically 
complaints recorded between 1 January 2007 and 31 December 2007. 
 
The OFT has acknowledged the limitations of the Consumer Direct database which 
contains self-reported complaints that have been reported to Consumer Direct only.  
The examples should, therefore, be considered as an illustrative analysis rather than 
a rigorous economic study of the sectors chosen for examination. For example, the 
OFT cautions that not all market reports relate specifically to the same year that the 
complaints data has been taken from (2007), and there may be a range of factors 
that contribute to the number of complaints received about a certain trader which 
have not been explored for the purpose of this study. 
 
However, the Consumer Direct database is a valuable resource of cases that give 
rise to complaints from consumers and provides access to useful case examples.  
This information combined with information provided by Trading Standards Officers 
and in the academic literature on collective redress and casework information 
produced by regulators helps to identify consumer issues where a representative 
action may be of benefit to consumers notwithstanding any concerns about the 
                                                          
93
 OFT ‘Consumer Detriment Study’ April 2008 
94
 OFT ‘Consumer Detriment Study’ April 2008, p50-53 
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effectiveness of such actions or whether better use of existing legislative provisions 
by the courts (for example a greater willingness to award compensation) might 
achieve the same results as introducing a representative action mechanism.   
 
The OFT’s data provides for a means of looking at cases by complaint type which 
suggests that it may make more sense to group cases by the actions of a trader 
rather than the specifics of each complaint. 
 
Combined with supplementary sources, the database has enabled an illustration of a 
broad range of cases that could potentially benefit from a representative action 
mechanism. 
 
Table of relevant and likely areas within which to search for case examples that 
could benefit from representative action. 
 
Complaint type Service area Purchase method  
defective goods (01A) double glazing, leather 
furniture, upholstered 
furniture, TVs, DVDs, lap 
tops, washing machines, 
fridges and freezers, 
second hand cars 
purchased by independent 
dealers, toys, cameras, 
women’s clothing, 
jewellery including repairs, 
watches including repairs, 
women’s footwear, 
motorised scooters, 
buggies/prams/pushchairs 
trader premises 
internet 
doorstep invited 
substandard services 
(02A) 
 
other general building 
work, fitted kitchen, central 
heating, roofing, plumbers 
and plumbing, fitted 
bathrooms, double 
glazing, conservatories, 
trader premises  
doorstep invited 
telephone 
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Complaint type Service area Purchase method  
car repairs and servicing 
purchased at independent 
garages, car parking and 
clamping, dry cleaning and 
laundry, holiday package 
overseas, other holiday 
types, guest houses and 
B&Bs, internet service 
providers, health clubs 
and gyms, photography, 
estate agents, letting 
agents advertising 
agencies 
breach of contract fitted kitchen, double 
glazing, upholstered 
furniture, leather furniture, 
TVs, Lap tops and 
notebooks, package 
holidays overseas 
telephone  
internet  
 
safety  
 
toys 
 
 
failure in delivery  
 
other personal goods and 
services, women’s clothing 
trader premises 
internet 
overcharging Plumber and plumbing, 
other general building 
work  
doorstep invited  
bogus selling  
 
lotteries, prize draws, 
roofing, tarmacing and 
paving 
unsolicited postal 
 
high pressure selling 
 
double glazing, holiday 
clubs 
uninvited doorstep 
unsolicited telephone 
direct marketing to 
vulnerable groups  
 
lotteries, prize draws, 
roofing, double glazing, 
tarmacing and paving, 
burglar alarms 
unsolicited postal  
doorstep uninvited  
 
Lincoln Law School A Report for BERR  
 
99 
Complaint type Service area Purchase method  
verbal 
misrepresentation/ 
misdescription 
 
lotteries, prize draws, 
advertising agencies, 
second hand cars from 
independent dealers, 
package holidays 
overseas 
 
advertising 
 
lotteries, prize draws, 
package holidays 
overseas 
trader premises 
unsolicited postal 
internet  
other offers of 
inadequate redress  
 
upholstered furniture, 
package holidays 
overseas, leather furniture, 
fridges and freezers, 
washing machines, 
internet service providers, 
fitted kitchens 
trader premises 
 
Source: OFT 
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APPENDIX 2 – APPLICATION OF ENFORCEABLE 
UNDERTAKINGS IN AUSTRALIA 
 
A commonly cited example of restorative justice being applied to a business context 
and consumer cases is the use of court ‘enforceable undertakings’ by the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC).  The OFT supplied information on 
the ACCC’s use of enforceable undertakings and we had also researched this issue 
as part of our assessment of whether a model existed for how enforcers and/or 
regulators might implement restorative justice in consumer cases. 
 
The broad objectives of resolutions via ‘enforceable undertakings’ are to achieve the 
cessation of the conduct, redress for parties adversely affected, implementation of 
compliance measures to prevent future breaches, and by means of publicity, an 
educative and deterrent effect in the wider community and/or industry.95    
 
These objectives complement the principles underpinning restorative justice, which is 
one of the reasons that ‘enforceable undertakings’ have been used as an example of 
restorative justice in business regulation.96 It is noted, however, that the ACCC does 
not explicitly label ‘enforceable undertakings’ as restorative justice, and while 
‘enforceable undertakings’ are argued to be demonstrative of restorative justice when 
they are at their best97 – they do not always necessarily demonstrate restorative 
justice.  However as outlined in Section 5 of this report, restorative practices can be 
employed either wholly or in part and still achieve reparation for affected consumers.   
 
Case examples 
 
The most common conducts giving rise to the enforceable undertaking in consumer 
protection cases included misleading, false or deceptive representations and non-
compliance with safety or product standards.  Cases similar in scope to cases dealt 
with by TSOs and regulators in the UK and where consumers suffer detriment.  
 
Many of the objections to the implementation of restorative justice on grounds of the 
apparent difficulty in identifying and implementing appropriate remedies for 
consumers seem to have been overcome by the ACCC.  It should be noted that there 
are differences in legislation between the UK and Australia and the jurisdiction of the 
ACCC differs from that of a body like the OFT.  But the enforceable undertakings 
model employed by the ACCC would seem to provide a clear indication of how, if 
properly implemented by enforcers and regulators, restorative penalties can be 
implemented in consumer cases.  The following is a selection of cases98 for which an 
enforceable undertaking was accepted by the ACCC, illustrating the scope of 
applicability, content of the undertakings and public accountability of the agreements. 
 
Enforceable undertakings are published online at www.accc.gov.au and also in the 
Commission’s Annual Reports.   
                                                          
95
 ACCC guidance on the use of enforceable undertakings, page 3 
96
 Parker, ‘Restorative Justice in Business Regulation?’; Macrory 2006. 
97
 Parker, ‘Restorative Justice in Business Regulation?’ 
98
 Summarised from Annual Reports and ACCC public register of Enforceable Undertakings  
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Industry 
 
Details Conduct Undertaking requirement 
Debt collection Alliance Factoring Pty Ltd 
17 August 2005 
 
Debt collection practices, involving undue 
harassment or coercion 
 To implement a trade practices compliance 
program; 
 To review internal procedures;  
 To undertake compliance audit; 
 To establish a recourse for debtors to lodge a 
dispute;  
 To sponsor an industry forum 
Retail (fruit juice) 
 
Tamarama Fresh Juices 
Australia Pty Ltd 
28 February 2006 
Allegation of Misleading or deceptive labelling of 
certain of fresh juice products (an allegation 
disputed by the trader)  
 
 To attend trade practices training 
Debt collection Collection House Limited & 
Lion Finance Pty Ltd 
1 February 2006 
Misleading and deceptive debt collection conduct.   To offer ex gratia payments in aggregate totalling 
up to $660 000 to a group of approximately 500 
NSW debtors from whom it collected ‘old debts’ 
between 2001 and 2004 
 To establish and maintain a Register of 
Communications and provide a copy of the register 
to the ACCC 
Motor vehicle GM Holden Ltd 
11 April 2006 
 
Misleading advertising concerning a motor vehicle 
promotion.  
 To write to each person who purchased a vehicle 
subject to the special discount offering them the 
opportunity to return the vehicle for a full refund; 
 To endeavour to comply with any industry 
standards developed by the ACCC that are 
generally adopted by the industry;  
 To make improvements to its trade practices 
compliance program  
 To engage an independent third party to review its 
trade practices compliance program 
Aviation  
 
Janue Pty Ltd  
14 October 2005 
 
Misleading and false representations as to the 
trader's accreditation.  
 Not to make representations that the company has 
accreditation as an ‘approved school’ with the 
International Air Transport Association (IATA) 
unless it did in fact have such accreditation;  
 To write to all customers who believed they were 
completing IATA accredited courses and offer 
those customers a refund;  
 To strengthen the existing corporate trade practices 
compliance program 
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Industry 
 
Details Conduct Undertaking requirement 
Real estate Manningham Real Estate Pty  
8 July 2005 
 
Misleading conduct and false representations 
regarding the applicability of Goods and Service 
Tax (GST) to the sale of real estate 
 To refrain from making false or misleading 
representations to potential purchasers regarding 
the applicability of GST to the sale of real estate; 
 To offer refunds representing half of the GST 
liability that was collected amounting to $24 175. 
 To strengthen the existing corporate trade practices 
compliance program 
Footwear Pegasus Investments & 
Holdings Pty Ltd  
15 February 2006 
 
False or misleading representations on a range of 
footwear.  
 Not supply and sell in Australia any footwear 
product that is labeled ‘100% Wool Lining’ and/or 
‘Australian Merino Wool’ where to the knowledge 
of Pegasus that representation is or may be false;  
 To offer consumers who were misled by the 
conduct a refund equal to the cost of the footwear 
purchased; publish a corrective notice; 
 To strengthen the existing corporate trade practices 
compliance program 
Cosmetics Priceline Pty Limited 
24 April 2006 
 
Priceline Pty Limited sold a number of cosmetic 
product brands that did not comply with the Trade 
Practices (Consumer Product Information 
Standards) (Cosmetics) Regulations 1991 
 To implement and maintain in all of its stores a 
permanent fixture on cosmetic display units that 
has plastic pockets for the insertion of ingredient 
lists;  
 To appoint a Priceline cosmetic manager in each 
Priceline store who will be responsible for 
authorising all cosmetic purchases and systems of 
display where cosmetics are displayed outside 
main cosmetic display units; 
 To conduct a weekly check of the cosmetic display 
units; trade practices compliance program;  
 To implement an effective complaints handling 
system 
E-commerce 
website 
software 
 
 
StoresOnline International, Inc. 
and StoresOnline, Inc. 
9 May 2006 
 
Misleading or deceptive conduct in relation to 
seminars promoting online web-based business 
opportunities 
 To offer refunds to affected customers;  
 Not to make false or misleading statements about 
its website packages nor make statements about the 
future performance of the packages without having 
reasonable grounds for so doing; give future 
customers a three-day ‘cooling off’ period; 
 contribute to the ACCC legal costs 
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Industry 
 
Details Conduct Undertaking requirement 
Complementary 
medicine 
 
Aussia Australia Pty Ltd 
18 June 2007 
 
Incorrect labelling of products, traditionally used in 
Chinese medicine. 
 To remove any misrepresentations from existing 
stock;  
 To inform resellers and purchasers of the 
incorrectly labelled products;  
 To review its advertising and promotional material 
to ensure that any representations comply with the 
Trade Practices Act; 
 To publish an article regarding country of origin 
claims in an appropriate Chinese publication 
Retail (snack 
foods) 
Uncle Tobys Foods Pty Limited 
12 September 2006 
 
False or misleading advertising.   To publish an article for the food industry on the 
importance of accurate advertising, 
 To review and implement recommended changes 
to its trade practices law compliance program 
Internet service 
provision 
Optus Internet Pty Limited  
Excite@Home Australia Pty Ltd 
20 September 2000 
 
Misleading advertising and contract terms.   Not advertise the service as including "unlimited 
downloads" or "unlimited access" and will remove 
all advertising material that incorporates references 
to "unlimited access" or "unlimited downloads";  
 To revise the Audio Use Policy (AUP);  
 To write to all customers who have been 
terminated and who have not been reconnected, 
confirming its position and offering a full refund of 
all moneys paid (including installation, monthly 
and termination fees);  
 To write to all current customers clarifying the 
AUP and allowing such customers 30 days to 
cancel their subscription if they wish; and  
 To write to all customers who have signed up for 
the service but have not yet been installed 
clarifying the AUP and refund their installation 
fees (if any) that have been paid if they wish to 
cancel their subscription. 
 
Enforceable Undertakings are published online at www.accc.gov.au and also in the Commission’s Annual Reports.   
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Appendix 3: Compensation Data 
 
 
Section 7 of this report identifies the lack of use of existing compensation provisions and we 
make a recommendation that further research is needed in this area.  Limited data on the 
amount of compensation paid in consumer cases has been provided by the OFT although 
further research into the number of compensation orders requested and made in consumer 
cases is required.  The table below consists of data from the OFT register of convictions 
showing the number of convictions recorded under each individual piece of legislation 
against the total amount of compensation paid under that legislation from the period 1 
November 2007 to 31 October 2008. 
 
      Total  Comp. in £ 
 
Trade Marks Act 1994   480       12,414 
 
Trade Descriptions Act 1968   288     106,652 
 
Theft Act 1968    17         5,956 
 
Road Traffic Act 1988    59         1,266 
 
Licensing Act     5            128 
 
Fraud Act 2006    22         9,415 
 
Forgery & Counterfeit Act 1981   12       11,070 
 
Food Safety Act 1990    5              75 
 
Fair Trading Act 1972    12            750 
 
European Community Act 1972  58        14,290 
 
Criminal Attempts Act 1987   4          4,203 
 
Consumer Protection Act 1987  120          4,128 
 
Common Law     6        29,949 
 
Business Names Act 1985   36   425 
 
Children & Young Persons Act 1933  1     15 
 
Total      1,125       200,736 
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Appendix 4: Enforcer/Regulator Research Questionnaire 
 
The research questionnaire sent to enforcers and regulators is reproduced below.  The 
questionnaire was sent with a covering letter outlining the aims of the research and the reasons 
why it was being undertaken.  (This reproduced version of the questionnaire has been reformatted 
to fit within the format of the research report) 
 
Trading Standards and other Enforcers. 
 
This research is into the need for and mechanisms to achieve, satisfactory redress for groups of 
consumers who have suffered detriment.  The subject of this questionnaire is to identify types 
and numbers of consumer cases suitable for restorative justice and Alternate Dispute 
Resolution (ADR).  Please answer as many questions as possible and supply supporting 
information wherever possible. 
 
PART 1 
Please provide details on the types and numbers of consumer cases reported and investigated 
per annum. 
 
Question 1: On average how many consumer complaints are reported to your trading 
standards/enforcement office each year? 
 
Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 2: On average how many monitoring or inspection visits does your trading 
standards/enforcement office conduct for consumer cases each year? 
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Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 3: On average how many cases does your trading standards/enforcement office deal 
with each year in each of the main categories listed below?   
 
Category  Number of Cases per annum 
Advice and Education  
Animal health and Welfare  
Weight and Measures  
Consumer Credit and Estate Agents  
Fair Trading  
Petroleum and Explosives  
Food Standards  
Underage Sales  
Other (please specify)  
 
Please provide any further information you are able to supply on the main types of cases dealt 
with and consumer protection issues involved. 
 
Comments 
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Question 4: Has there been any increase in the number of complaints made by members of the 
public in any particular area of your work over the last five years?  If so, please state which 
area has seen the increase and, if known, explain the reason for the increase? 
 
Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 5: How many cases are dealt with by the different types of formal enforcement action 
each year?  Please list the numbers against each category below.  
 
 Caution 
 Formal Warning 
 Prosecution 
 Enforcement Notice 
 Seizure of goods 
 Forfeiture of Goods 
 Suspension on the supply of goods 
 Other (please provide further details) 
 
Comments 
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Question 6: For those cases that are not the subject of formal enforcement action what is the 
main reason why formal enforcement action is not taken?  Please tick one box only.  
 
 Insufficient Evidence or no offence disclosed by investigation 
 Not in the public Interest 
 Undertaking given by trader or business 
 Advice or information given 
 Warning given 
 Attitude of the offender 
 Voluntary compliance achieved 
 Other (please provide further details) 
 
 Please provide any further details that may explain your answer 
Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 7: What criteria are used by your office when determining that a case should not be 
pursued to prosecution but where a breach of consumer protection legislation can be proved?  
If possible please provide supporting evidence and details of any quantified costs or benefits 
that determine whether a case will be pursued.  
  
Comments 
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PART 2: Additional Enforcement Powers 
 
The Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Bill proposes additional enforcement powers for 
consumer cases including the option to impose fixed penalties, require a cessation of business 
practices, and accept undertakings from traders and businesses.  We should be grateful for your 
views on how these options might work. 
 
Question 8: Where cases are not pursued through to formal enforcement action do you agree 
that the additional enforcement options contained in the Regulatory Enforcement and 
Sanctions Bill might lead to more cases being pursued using the new enforcement options? 
Please explain your reasons    
 
Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Question 9: Does your office intend to use the full range of additional powers provided for in 
the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Bill?  If not, please state which if any of the 
additional powers you intend to use and explain any difficulties you perceive in using the new 
powers.   
 
Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
  
Lincoln Law School       A Report for BERR 110 
 
Question 10: For each of the new enforcement powers please indicate how likely it is that they 
will be used in your enforcement work. 
 
Type of penalty Frequently   Occasionally    Seldom    Rarely 
Fixed financial penalty  
Cessation notice  
Undertaking  
Restoration Notice  
Compliance Notice  
 
Please give reasons for your answer and if possible provide examples that show the types of 
cases where the various remedies might be used. 
 
Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Question 11: Do you agree that the level of any fixed penalties should be calculated to provide 
a deterrent effect or to reflect the time and trouble caused to the consumer?  Please explain 
your reasons and provide any additional information you consider relevant to the level of fixed 
penalties. 
   
Comments 
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PART 3: Restorative Justice 
 
There is a proposal to introduce ‘restorative justice’ in consumer protection cases.  The 
principles of restorative justice are that rather than simple punishment of an offender by fines 
or custodial sentencing, the penalty should contain a restorative element that attempts to 
‘repair the harm’ caused by an offence or business practice.  In addition, restorative principles 
propose that as part of the remedy to a complaint the ‘victim’ should: receive an apology, be 
provided with an opportunity to meet with the offender and make them aware of the impact of 
their crime or business practice and that victims should be able to obtain answers from 
offenders.  We should be grateful for your views on how restorative justice might work in the 
types of cases you deal with. 
 
Question 12: Prior to receiving this questionnaire how familiar were you with the concept of 
restorative justice? 
 
VERY FAMILIAR FAIRLY FAMILIAR NOT VERY UNAWARE 
(please circle as appropriate) 
 
Please give reasons for your answer. 
   
Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 13: If the option to use restorative principles/justice is introduced for consumer cases 
do you consider that it will require any changes to the way that cases are investigated and 
enforcement decisions are taken by your office? 
 
YES/NO* please delete as appropriate. 
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Question 14: Do you consider that there are circumstances where restorative principles can be 
applied to the types of cases that you handle or investigate even if it cannot be applied to all 
cases? 
 
YES/NO* please delete as appropriate 
 
If you answered ‘NO’ to Question 14 please go on to Question 18. 
 
Question 15:  If you answered ‘YES’ to Question 14, please tick the appropriate boxes below to 
indicate which restorative elements you believe might be applicable to your casework. 
 
 Apology for the consumer (victim) 
 Dialogue between consumer and trader/business (offender) 
 Offender to understand the impact and consequences of their behaviour or 
business practice 
 Offender to provide reparation for the victim 
 Victim to obtain answers and/or achieve closure 
 
Please provide reasons for your answer.    
 
Comments 
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Question 16:  How might the restorative principle of ‘repairing harm’ best be applied to 
consumer cases?  Please tick one box only. 
 
 Financial compensation for loss or damage 
 Compensation for time and trouble incurred by consumer 
 Replacement of faulty goods 
 Changes to business practices 
 Provision of goods or services not (or badly) supplied 
 Other (please specify) 
 
Please give reasons for your answer.    
 
Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 17: Please provide an example(s) of the type of case or consumer issue that might be 
suitable for the application of restorative principles.   
   
Comments 
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Question 18: Do you agree that consumers should be consulted about any restorative element 
applied to enforcement notices or recommended as remedies?  If not, please explain your 
reasons. 
   
Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 19: If appropriate legislation is enacted to introduce restorative justice in consumer 
cases do you foresee any practical difficulties in enforcing restorative penalties? 
 
YES/NO* please delete as appropriate. 
 
Please give reasons for your answer. 
   
Comments 
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Question 20: Do you have any other comments on the proposed enforcement provisions of the 
Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Bill or achieving better consumer redress? 
 
Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for letting us have your views. If you would also be interested in being interviewed 
for this research or would like the opportunity to provide any further information please tick 
the statement below and provide contact details. 
 
Please contact 
 
………………………………………………………  
 
…………………………………………..………….  
 
concerning an interview 
 
 
Please return your completed questionnaire to Angus Nurse by email at anurse@lincoln.ac.uk or 
by post to him at Faculty of Business and Law, University of Lincoln, Brayford Pool, Lincoln, 
LN6 7TS 
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Appendix 5: Consumer Representatives Research Questionnaire 
 
The research questionnaire sent to consumer groups and representatives is reproduced below.  The 
questionnaire was sent with a covering letter outlining the aims of the research and the reasons 
why it was being undertaken.  (This reproduced version of the questionnaire has been reformatted 
to fit the format of this research report) 
 
Consumer Representatives and Representative Actions. 
 
This research is into the need for and mechanisms to achieve, satisfactory compensation for 
groups of consumers who have suffered detriment.  The subject of this questionnaire is to 
identify types of consumer cases suitable for group actions and how representative actions 
might work to achieve consumer redress.  Please answer as many questions as possible and 
supply supporting information wherever possible. 
 
PART 1 
Please provide details on the types and average numbers of consumer cases reported to your 
organisation and pursued or investigated per annum. 
 
Question 1: Please tick one box from the following list of options that best describes you.  If 
you fall into more than one category please only tick your main category or the category that 
you feel best describes you:  
 
 Charity  
 Consumer Watchdog  
 Trade Union  
 Interest Group 
 Law Centre 
 Representative Organisation 
 Advice Agency 
 Other (e.g. consultant or private individual) 
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Question 2: On average how many consumer complaints does your organisation receive each 
year? 
 
Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 3: What is the main area of complaints or advocacy work for your organisation?   
 
Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 4: On average how many consumer complaints/cases does your organisation pursue 
each year in each of the main categories listed below?   
 
Category  Number of Cases per annum 
Advice and Education  
Animal health and Welfare  
Housing  
Consumer Credit and Estate Agents  
Fair Trading  
Petroleum and Explosives  
Food Standards  
Underage Sales  
Other (please specify)  
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Question 5: Has there been any increase in the number of complaints made by members of the 
public in any particular area of your work over the last five years?  If so, please state which 
area(s) have seen the increase and, if known, explain the reason for the increase? 
 
Comments 
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PART 2: Enforcement Action 
 
The Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Bill proposes additional enforcement powers for 
consumer cases including the option to impose fixed penalties, require a cessation of business 
practices, and accept undertakings from traders and businesses. These undertakings and some 
forms of penalty notice contained in the Bill may require that remedies provided by businesses 
should contain a restorative element that attempts to ‘repair the harm’ caused by an offence or 
business practice.  We should be grateful for your views on the effectiveness of current 
enforcement activity and the types of cases that are subject to formal enforcement action.  We 
should also be grateful for any views you have on how the additional penalties might work to 
achieve consumer redress. 
 
Question 6: Of the cases that you have pursued on consumers’ behalf, on average how many 
cases result in formal enforcement action each year?  Please list the numbers against each 
category below.  
 
 Caution 
 Formal Warning 
 Prosecution 
 Enforcement Notice 
 Seizure of goods 
 Forfeiture of Goods 
 Suspension on the supply of goods 
 Other (please provide further details) 
 
Please provide any supporting information that you have on the reasons for the particular type 
of enforcement action being pursued. 
Comments 
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Please note the next question concerns cases that are not pursued. 
 
Question 7: For those cases that do not result in formal enforcement action what are the main 
reasons provided to you by enforcers for why no further enforcement action is taken?  Please 
tick a maximum of three and number your responses in order of priority (1 being the most 
common).  
 
 Insufficient Evidence or no offence disclosed by investigation 
 Not in the public Interest 
 Caution considered more appropriate 
 Advice or information given instead 
 Warning given 
 Attitude of the offender 
 Voluntary compliance achieved 
 Other (please provide further details) 
 
 Please provide any further details that may explain your answer 
Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 8: When formal enforcement action is not taken how well do you think that consumers 
generally understand the reasons why a case is not being pursued? 
 
GENERALLY UNDERSTAND  SOMETIMES UNDERSTAND   
SELDOM UNDERSTAND  RARELY UNDERSTAND 
(please circle as appropriate) 
 
Please give reasons for your answer    
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Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 9: Are the remedies currently being provided for consumers when bringing complaints 
adequate?   
 
YES/NO*please delete as appropriate. 
 
Question 10: If you answered ‘YES’ to question 9 please go on to question 11.  If not, please 
provide reasons and any supporting evidence for your answer and explain what further 
remedies you believe would be appropriate.    
 
Comments 
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Question 11: Do you think the additional available penalties in the Regulatory Enforcement and 
Sanctions Bill which allow for fixed financial penalties, restorative penalties and cessation 
notices to be imposed (in addition to and as an alternative to prosecution) are adequate?  
Please explain the reasons for your answer. 
 
Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART 3: Representative Actions 
 
There is a proposal to introduce ‘representative actions’ in consumer protection cases which 
would allow authorised consumer groups to take court action on behalf of individual named 
consumers who have suffered detriment.  Representative actions mean that one case can be 
brought on behalf of a number of consumers with the same or similar complaints against a 
trader or business.  If a case is successful any compensation is shared out among all the 
affected consumers who have joined the case. 
 
Question 12: If the option to bring representative actions on behalf of groups of consumers was 
available to your organisation would you use this?  
 
YES/NO*please delete as appropriate. 
 
If you answered ‘NO’ please go to Question 14.  If you answered ‘YES’, please explain the types 
of cases that you might consider suitable for representative action cases and answer Question 
13.   
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Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 13: If possible, please provide details of the likely number of cases (per year) that 
you might consider pursuing as representative actions for consumers.  Please give reasons 
for your answer. 
 
Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please go to Question 15. 
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Question 14: If you would not consider bringing representative actions if the option were 
available please explain the reasons for your answer. 
 
Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 15: Do you think that the option to bring representative action cases on behalf of 
named consumers would make it easier to obtain redress for the consumer?  
 
YES/NO* please delete as appropriate. 
 
If you answered ‘NO’, please state what additional provisions you think are necessary to make 
consumer redress easier and explain your reasons.  If you answered ‘YES’ please give reasons 
for your answer. 
 
Comments 
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PART 4: Restorative Justice 
 
There is a proposal to introduce ‘restorative justice’ in consumer protection cases.  The 
principles of restorative justice are that rather than simple punishment of an offender by fines 
or custodial sentencing, the penalty should contain a restorative element that attempts to 
‘repair the harm’ caused by an offence or business practice.  In addition, restorative principles 
propose that as part of the remedy to a complaint the ‘victim’ should: receive an apology, be 
provided with an opportunity to meet with the offender and make them aware of the impact of 
their crime or business practice and that victims should be able to obtain answers from 
offenders.  If restorative attempts are unsuccessful cases might still proceed to formal 
enforcement.  We should be grateful for your views on how restorative justice might work in 
the types of cases you deal with. 
 
 
Question 16: Prior to receiving this questionnaire how familiar were you with the concept of 
restorative justice? 
 
VERY FAMILIAR FAIRLY FAMILIAR NOT VERY UNAWARE 
(please circle as appropriate) 
 
Question 17: Do you agree that consumers should have a say in the penalty imposed by 
regulators?   
 
YES/NO* please delete as appropriate. 
 
If you answered ‘NO’, please say how you think the regulators should determine the 
appropriate remedy for a complaint, and provide supporting evidence for your preference 
 
Comments 
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Question 18: For the cases that consumers bring to your attention or that you pursue please 
tick one box to indicate the (value) range in terms of loss to consumers in which the majority of 
cases fall. 
 
 Less than £50 
 Less than £100 
 Less than £500  
 Less than £1000 
 Greater than £1000 
      
Please give reasons and any supporting information that might explain your answer. 
 
Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Question 19: Do you think that the additional enforcement tools available in the Regulatory 
Enforcement and Sanctions Bill should require enforcers to inform consumers of their 
provisional view of how to remedy a complaint?  
 
If so, please state how you think this information should be provided by enforcers, and explain 
your reasons. 
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Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 20: Do you agree that the restorative justice approach is suitable for consumer cases?  
 
YES/NO* please delete as appropriate. 
 
If you answered ‘NO’, please state what difficulties you think the restorative justice approach 
might cause and explain your reasons. 
 
Comments 
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Question 21: What is the likely impact on your organisation of the proposed Bill? Where 
possible, please provide supporting evidence including (possible) quantified costs and benefits 
relating to bringing representative actions, familiarisation and/or legal costs, costs of the 
increased work load, and the annual cost of taking representative actions (compared to the cost 
of bringing complaints under current Regulations). 
 
Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Question 22: Do you agree that regulators should pursue remedies that try to put the consumer 
back into the position they would have been in had the fault/harm not occurred?  Please 
explain the reasons for your answer and provide supporting evidence where possible. 
 
Comments 
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Question 23: Do you think that the proposals in the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Bill 
will provide particular opportunities for redress in respect of race equality, disability equality, 
age equality or gender equality? If so, please state why, and provide supporting evidence of any 
disadvantage currently suffered by particular groups when pursuing complaints, if possible.  
 
Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 24: Do you have any other comments on the proposed use of representative actions 
and restorative justice in consumer cases? 
 
Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for letting us have your views. If you would also be interested in being interviewed 
for this research or would like the opportunity to provide any further information please tick 
the statement below and supply your contact details. 
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Please contact 
 
………………………………………………………  
 
…………………………………………..………….  
 
concerning an interview 
 
 
 
Please return your completed questionnaire to Angus Nurse at anurse@lincoln.ac.uk or by post 
to him at Faculty of Business and Law, University of Lincoln, Brayford Pool, Lincoln, LN6 7TS 
 
